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Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies

*Most embrace diversity but see conflicts between partisan, racial
and ethnic groups*

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How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on attitudes toward diversity and conflict around the world. For this report, we conducted nationally representative surveys of 16,254 adults from March 12 to May 26, 2021, in 16 advanced economies. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.

In the United States, we surveyed 2,596 U.S. adults from Feb. 1 to 7, 2021. Everyone who took part in the U.S. survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories.

This study was conducted in places where nationally representative telephone surveys are feasible. Due to the coronavirus outbreak, [face-to-face interviewing is not currently possible](#) in many parts of the world.

To account for the fact that some publics refer to the coronavirus differently, in South Korea, the survey asked about the “Corona19 outbreak.” In Japan, the survey asked about the “novel coronavirus outbreak.” In Greece, the survey asked about the “coronavirus pandemic.” In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Taiwan, the survey asked about the “COVID-19 outbreak.” All other surveys used the term “coronavirus outbreak.”

Here are the [questions](#) used for the report, along with responses. See our [methodology](#) database for more information about the survey methods outside the U.S. For respondents in the U.S., read more about the [ATP’s methodology](#).

Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies

Most embrace diversity but see conflicts between partisan, racial and ethnic groups


Wide majorities in most of the 17 advanced economies surveyed by Pew Research Center say having people of many different backgrounds improves their society. Outside of Japan and Greece, around six-in-ten or more hold this view, and in many places – including Singapore, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and Taiwan – at least eight-in-ten describe where they live as benefiting from people of different ethnic groups, religions and races.

Even in Japan and Greece, the share who think diversity makes their country better has increased by double digits since the question was last asked four years ago, and significant increases have also taken place in most other nations where trends are available.

Alongside this growing openness to diversity, however, is a recognition that societies

Increasing shares see diversity positively

% who say having people of many different backgrounds, such as different ethnic groups, religions and races, makes (survey public) a **better** place to live




Note: Only statistically significant changes shown.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q25.
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may not be living up to these ideals: In fact, most people say racial or ethnic discrimination is a problem in their society. Half or more in almost every place surveyed describe discrimination as at least a somewhat serious problem – including around three-quarters or more who have this view in Italy, France, Sweden, the U.S. and Germany. And, in eight surveyed publics, at least half describe their society as one with conflicts between people of different racial or ethnic groups. The U.S. is the country with the largest share of the public saying there is racial or ethnic conflict.

Perceptions of conflict between groups much higher in South Korea and U.S., especially between those who support different political parties

% who say that in (survey public), there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between ...



Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a, b, d & e. "People who live in cities and people who live in rural areas" not asked in Singapore.

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Notably, however, in most societies racial and ethnic divisions are *not* seen as the most salient cleavage. Rather, in the majority of places surveyed, more people identify conflicts between people who support different political parties than conflicts between people with different ethnic or racial backgrounds. Political divisions are also seen as greater than the other two dimensions tested: between those with different religions and between urban and rural residents. (For more on the actual composition of each public surveyed on each of these dimensions, see [Appendix A](#).)


In the U.S. and South Korea, 90% say there are at least strong conflicts between those who support different parties – including around half or more in each country who say these conflicts are *very* strong. In Taiwan, France and Italy, around two-thirds say the political conflicts in their society are strong. Still, in around half of the surveyed publics, fewer than 50% say the same.

In some places, this acrimony has risen to the level that people think their fellow citizens no longer disagree simply over policies, but also over basic facts. In France, the U.S., Italy, Spain and Belgium, half or more think that most people in their country disagree on basic facts more than they agree. Across most societies surveyed, those who see conflict among partisans are more likely to say people disagree on the basic facts than those who do not see such conflicts.

Views on the topic are also closely related to views of the governing party or parties in nearly every society (for more on how governing party is defined, see [Appendix B](#)). In every place but the U.S. and Italy, those with unfavorable views of the governing coalition are more likely to say most people disagree on the basic facts than those with favorable views of the government.

Around half or more in several publics say people do not agree on basic facts

*% who say when it comes to important issues facing (survey public), people may disagree over policies, but most people **disagree** on basic facts*



Note: Q27 was not asked in Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q27. "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

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
Although divisions between racial and ethnic groups as well as between partisans are palpable for many, other types of conflicts are less commonly perceived. For example, in no place surveyed does a majority think there are strong conflicts between people who live in cities and people who live in rural areas.

Similarly, only a minority in most countries say there are divisions between people who practice different religions – though around half or more do sense such conflicts in South Korea, France and the U.S.

Beyond divisions between specific groups, there is also a widespread – and growing – sense that societies are more divided now than they were before the COVID-19 pandemic. A [median of 61% across the 17 advanced economies](#) say they are now more divided than before the outbreak, and in all but one of the 13 countries also polled in summer 2020, the sense that societies are more divided than united has risen significantly since last year. Those who describe their society as more divided than before the global health emergency are also significantly more likely to see conflicts between different groups in society and to say their fellow citizens disagree over basic facts.

Views of COVID-19's effect on unity factor into views of political conflict

% who say that in (survey public), there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between people who support different political parties among those who think (survey public) is now ___ than before the coronavirus outbreak



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q26a.
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
Spotlight: Divided societies

In the U.S., France and South Korea, at least a majority say that having people of many different backgrounds makes their country a better place to live. Still, these three countries stand out for the degree to which people perceive various conflicts. In each of these places, the publics are among the most likely to describe their society as divided, and this is the case across each of the dimensions asked about: political, racial and ethnic, religious, and geographic.

Perceived strength of societal conflicts varies widely

% who say that in (survey public), there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between ...

● Most divided publics ● Least divided publics



Note: Colored dots represent the most divided and least divided societies based on a summary index of perceived social conflict which averages the responses across the four questions depicted. "People who live in cities and people who live in rural areas" not asked in Singapore.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a, b, d & e.

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United States

When it comes to perceived political and ethnic conflicts, no public is more divided than Americans: 90% say there are conflicts between people who support different political parties and 71% say the same when it comes to ethnic and racial groups. ([Results of a different question](#) asking specifically about conflicts between Democrats and Republicans also found that 71% of Americans think conflicts between the party coalitions are very strong and another 20% say they are somewhat strong. The sense of conflicts between Democrats and Republicans also increased between 2012 and 2020.)


In terms of divisions between people who practice different religions and between urban and rural residents, again, Americans consistently rate as one of the three most divided publics of the 17 surveyed.

Some of these perceived divisions differ by racial and ethnic background. For example, more Black adults (82%) see conflict between people with different ethnic or racial backgrounds than White (69%) or Hispanic (70%) adults.

Another major axis of division in the U.S. is partisan identification. Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party are much more likely to see conflict between people of different racial and ethnic groups than are Republicans and independents who lean Republican. There are also partisan differences in opinion over whether people who practice different religions or those who live in urban and rural areas have conflicts.

Democrats more likely to see most societal conflicts, though both parties see partisan ones

% who say that in the United States there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between each of the following among ...



Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a, b, d & e. "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

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Notably, however, both Democrats and Republicans share a widespread belief that there are conflicts between those who support different political parties. Democrats and Republicans are


also equally likely to say Americans disagree over basic facts. For more, see [“Americans see stronger societal conflicts than people in other advanced economies.”](#)

France

On three of the four dimensions asked about, French adults are among the most likely to say there are conflicts – and the highest share in France perceives divisions between rural and urban residents. Partisanship plays some role in perceived divisions. Supporters of the Republicans, a right-of-center party, tend to see more conflicts than supporters of the Socialist Party or the ruling En Marche. For example, 76% who support the Republicans say there is conflict between people of different racial or ethnic groups, compared with 56% of Socialist Party supporters or 54% of En Marche supporters.¹ French women are also more likely to see conflicts in many parts of their society than are men.

Political divisions in France regarding strength of conflicts

% who say that in France there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between ...



Note: Supporters of National Rally and La France Insoumise are those who have a favorable view of each party. Supporters of other parties are those who identified with that party when asked the open-ended question “Which political party do you feel closest to?”

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a, b, d & e.

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¹ Because only 12% of French adults identify as National Rally supporters and 6% as La France Insoumise supporters in an open-ended question asking which party people feel closest to, we are unable to examine opinion among these supporters. But there are no significant differences between those who have a favorable view of either of these parties and those who have an unfavorable view of them on most of the conflicts tested in the survey.

South Korea

More in South Korea than in any other public surveyed say there are conflicts between people who practice different religions (61%) in their society. They are also tied with the U.S. as the society where the highest share sees partisan divisions: 90% of South Koreans say this, including 50% who say such conflicts are very strong. And, on issues between ethnic and racial groups and between rural and urban residents, South Korea is consistently one of the top three most divided publics.

There is no single pattern to the divisions that South Koreans perceive in their society. Rather, depending on the conflict in question, different cleavages emerge. For example, when it comes to conflicts between rural and urban residents, those with lower incomes are more likely to identify conflicts than those with higher incomes. Younger South Koreans, for their part, are more likely to say there are racial or ethnic conflicts in their society than are older people, and those with higher education levels also agree relative to those with lower education levels.


Spotlight: Societies with fewer divisions

Singapore

The small island nation of Singapore is one of the least divided societies surveyed. Although it is [ethnically and racially diverse](#) – and even boasts four official languages that correspond with the dominant ethnic groups – fewer Singaporeans (25%) report conflicts between people of different ethnic and racial backgrounds than nearly any other public surveyed. Singaporeans are also among the least divided religiously, with only 21% saying there are conflicts between people who practice different religions, despite being quite

Few in Singapore say there are conflicts, though perceptions differ by ethnic and religious identity

% who say that in Singapore, there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between ...



Note: "People who live in cities and people who live in rural areas" not asked in Singapore.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a, b, d & e.
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heterogeneous religiously. Notably, however, perceived divisions vary based on people's self-reported ethnic and religious identity. For example, ethnic Indians and Malays are more likely to see political, ethnic and religious conflicts than ethnic Chinese. Similarly, Muslims are somewhat more likely to see conflicts both between those who practice different religions and those of different racial and ethnic groups than are self-reported Buddhists or Christians.

Singapore also stands out for seeing the fewest divisions between people who support different political parties (33%). The nation-state is largely governed by the People's Action Party, which garnered around 61% of the vote and 89% of parliamentary seats in the most recent 2020 election, with the Worker's Party securing the remainder. Singaporeans were not asked about conflicts between rural and urban residents because the nation-state is entirely urban.

Spain

Spaniards are the least divided among the 17 publics surveyed when it comes to geography, with only 12% of the public saying there are conflicts between rural and urban residents. Only 19% report conflicts among those who practice different religions, making it one of the two least religiously divided societies. And only around a third see conflicts between those with different racial and ethnic backgrounds, which ranks the country in the bottom three for this division as well. Still, when it comes to partisan differences, Spaniards see more conflicts. This country – which has active separatist movements, and has seen the collapse of the two-party system and the rise of populist parties – is one where a 58% majority see at least some conflict between those who support different political parties. Spaniards on the ideological left are somewhat more likely than those on the right to describe conflicts between partisans.

Taiwan

The share of adults in Taiwan who say there are conflicts between people who practice different religions (12%) is smaller than the share who say the same in any of the other places surveyed. They are also among the least likely to report conflicts between rural and urban residents (15%) and between those with different racial and ethnic backgrounds (22%). Still, adults in Taiwan do see major divisions between those who support different political parties: 69% say there are conflicts, which ranks the island among the top three most politically divided locations. Supporters of the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and nonsupporters are equally likely to see such political disagreements.


These are among the findings of a new Pew Research Center survey, conducted from Feb. 1 to May 26, 2021, among 18,850 adults in 17 advanced economies. Other key findings include:

- **People on the ideological left are often more likely to say diversity improves their societies, as well as to describe discrimination as a problem.** But when it comes to identifying conflicts between different racial and ethnic groups, the relationship varies. In the U.S. and Greece, those on the left are more likely to describe these racial tensions than those on the right, whereas in Sweden, Italy and Germany, the opposite is true.

- **Younger respondents tend to say people of different backgrounds make their society a better place to live – but also tend to see more conflicts and discrimination in their society than older people.** For example, in Greece, around six-in-ten of those under age 30 say having people of many different ethnic groups, religions and races improves their society, compared with only around four-in-ten of those ages 65 and older who say the same. Yet those under 30 are also around twice as likely – or more – as those ages 65 and older to report conflicts between people who support different parties, between different ethnic groups, and between different religious groups.

Younger people more likely to see benefits of diversity

*% who say having people of many different backgrounds, such as different ethnic groups, religions and races, makes (survey public) a **better** place to live*



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q25.
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- In some publics, people who **think the economy is doing well** tend to see fewer conflicts between groups in their society and see more benefits stemming from diverse people living around them.


Diverse society seen positively in most advanced economies

Across most of the 17 advanced economies surveyed, majorities – and in many cases, large majorities – say that having people of many ethnic groups, religions and races makes their society a better place to live. This opinion is most strongly held in Singapore, where 92% say that having people of different ethnic groups, religions and races makes Singapore a better place to live. Eight-in-ten or more in New Zealand, the U.S., Canada, the UK, Australia and Taiwan also say having people of many different backgrounds makes for a better place to live.

But this opinion is not universally held. About half of Greek and Japanese adults say that having a diverse society makes their country a *worse* place to live. Still, this represents significant declines from 2017, when majorities in Greece (62%) and Japan (57%) said diversity makes their country a worse place to live.

Many believe their society to be better off with people of many backgrounds

% who say having people of many different backgrounds, such as different ethnic groups, religions and races, makes (survey public) a ___ place to live



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q25.

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In fact, attitudes have generally become more open to diversity since the question was last asked in 2017. The share who say having people of many different backgrounds makes their society a better place to live has increased significantly in nine of 11 countries where the question was posed in both 2017 and 2021. Views have changed most dramatically in Greece, where 45% now say having people of many different backgrounds makes their society better compared with just 21% who held that view in 2017, an increase of 24 percentage points.

While majorities in nearly every survey public agree that diversity in society is a positive, younger people and those with more education are significantly more likely than older people and those with less education to hold this opinion.

For example, 84% of Italians ages 18 to 29 say having people of many different backgrounds makes Italy a better place to live, while about half (51%) of Italians ages 65 and older agree. Italy also has the largest attitudinal gap between those with a postsecondary education or more and those with less than a postsecondary education: 89% of more educated Italians view diversity positively, compared with 58% of educated Italians with less education, a gap of 31 points.

Wealthier people express more positive views of diversity than those with lower incomes in some of the places surveyed. For instance, nine-in-ten Britons with higher incomes say having people of many different ethnic groups, races and religions makes the UK a better place to live; eight-in-ten Britons with lower incomes say the same. Income gaps also appear in Italy, Australia, France, Belgium, Sweden, Canada, Singapore and the U.S.

Larger shares see benefits of diversity in 2021 than in 2017

*% who say having people of many different backgrounds, such as different ethnic groups, religions and races, makes (survey public) a **better** place to live*

	2017	2021	2017-2021 change
	%	%	
Greece	21	45	▲ 24
Japan	24	39	▲ 15
Netherlands	50	62	▲ 12
UK	75	85	▲ 10
Spain	67	76	▲ 9
Germany	65	71	▲ 6
South Korea	53	59	▲ 6
Australia	80	85	▲ 5
Sweden	73	78	▲ 5

Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q25.
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
And in 12 of 17 advanced economies, those who say the current economic situation is good are significantly more likely to say diversity makes their society better than those who say the economic situation is bad.

Large divides on the question appear between supporters and nonsupporters of right-wing populist parties in Europe, many of which advocate for strict anti-immigration policies and [openly oppose multiculturalism](#) (for more on how populist parties are defined, see [Appendix C](#)). The divide is largest between those with favorable and unfavorable views of [Sweden Democrats](#) (48% vs. 89%, respectively).

On the other hand, supporters of center and left-wing populist parties in Italy, Greece, France and Spain are *more* likely to say diversity makes their country a better place to live.

Right-wing populist party supporters less likely to say a diverse society is a better place to live

% who say having people of many different backgrounds, such as different ethnic groups, religions and races, makes (survey public) a **better** place to live among those with a ___ view of ...



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant. For more information on European populist parties, see Appendix C.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q25.
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Discrimination seen as a serious problem in most advanced economies

When it comes to racial and ethnic discrimination, a median of 67% say it is a serious or very serious problem in their own society, though views vary widely.


Americans and Canadians generally agree that racial and ethnic discrimination is at least a serious problem in their respective countries. Around three-quarters of Americans think so, as do around two-thirds of Canadians.

Across Europe, a median of around seven-in-ten say discrimination against people based on their race or ethnicity is a serious or very serious problem, while only about a quarter think it is not too serious of a problem or not a problem at all. Italy reports the highest percentage of adults who say racial and ethnic discrimination is a very serious problem (46%).

In the Asia-Pacific region, views on the topic vary more widely than in Europe and North America. At least six-in-ten Australians and New Zealanders say discrimination against people based on their race and ethnicity is a serious or very serious problem in their country. Taiwan, Singapore and Japan are the only places surveyed where majorities say discrimination is either not too serious or not a problem at all.

Discrimination based on race and ethnicity considered to be a problem

% who say discrimination against people based on their race or ethnicity is a ___ in (survey public)



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q28b. "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

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
In 14 of the 17 advanced economies surveyed, younger people are significantly more likely than older people to say racial or ethnic discrimination is a very serious problem. This is especially true in Italy, where two-thirds of Italians ages 18 to 29 say racial or ethnic discrimination is a very serious problem, while only about one-third of Italians ages 65 and older say the same.

Age gaps of 20 percentage points or more also appear in Spain, Australia and New Zealand. Even in Japan, where only 7% overall say racial or ethnic discrimination is a very serious problem, adults under 30 are 10 points more likely than those 65 and older to hold this view (13% and 3%, respectively).

While there are few differences in responses by education or income, women are more likely than men to say racial or ethnic discrimination is a serious or very serious problem in 13 of 17 publics surveyed.

Younger people more likely to think racial or ethnic discrimination is a very serious problem

% who say discrimination against people based on their race or ethnicity is a **very serious** problem in (survey public)



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q28b.
 "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"


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In keeping with previous findings that [ideological divisions in the U.S. are wider](#) than in other countries, the U.S. is by far the most ideologically divided on the question of racial and ethnic discrimination. About two-thirds of Americans on the left say racial and ethnic discrimination in the U.S. is a very serious problem; only 19% of Americans on the right hold that view.

Still, there are significant left-right divides in many other countries on the seriousness of racial and ethnic discrimination. Australians, Canadians and Italians on the left are more than 20 points more likely than those on the right to say discrimination based on race or ethnicity is a very serious problem in their country.

Ideological left more concerned about racial and ethnic discrimination

% who say discrimination against people based on their race or ethnicity is a **very serious** problem in (survey public)



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. In U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q28b. "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

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Perceived social conflict

To understand how people view divisions in their societies, we asked about the strength of the conflict that people see between various groups, including: 1) those who support different political parties, 2) those with different ethnic or racial backgrounds, 3) those who practice different religions and 4) those who live in cities compared with those who live in rural areas. (For more on each society's composition across these four dimensions, see [Appendix A.](#))


We created a summary index of perceived social conflict by averaging responses across the four questions. Higher values indicate that, on average, people see more friction between groups in their society.

Perceived conflict is highest in the U.S., South Korea and France. Notably, Koreans are much more likely than others in the Asia-Pacific region to view conflict among social groups. Four of the five publics with the lowest conflict scores are in this region: Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and New Zealand. In contrast, conflict scores tend to be relatively higher in North America and Europe. Here, Spain is the exception, with a generally low average.

Though the overall magnitude varies across the 17 publics surveyed, most show the same pattern when it comes to which groups are more or less likely to be divided. Overall, people see the strongest conflicts among those who support different political parties and those with different ethnic or racial backgrounds. In comparison, people tend to see less conflict among those

Those in U.S., South Korea and France see more conflict in their societies

Mean perceived conflict on a scale of 1 (no conflicts in any area) to 4 (very strong conflicts in all areas)



Note: Means for each respondent are calculated based on four questions about perceived conflict between various groups of people where they live. Possible responses to each question ranged from 1 (no conflict) to 4 (very strong conflict). Only those who provided substantive answers to at least three questions are included in the overall mean for each public, comprising a large subsample (n = 18,685) out of the total sample (n = 18,850). Those who replied "Don't know" to more than one question are not included in the overall mean. "People who live in cities and people who live in rural areas" not asked in Singapore. The mean in Singapore is based on three questions.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a-b, d-e. "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

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who practice different religions. And relatively few see strong tensions between people who live in cities and people who live in rural areas.

Perceived conflict between supporters of different political parties

A median of 50% across the 17 publics surveyed say there are strong conflicts between people who support different political parties. This sentiment is particularly high in the U.S. and South Korea, where nine-in-ten see tensions between different party backers. At least half in both countries say these conflicts are *very* strong.


Compared with their southern neighbors, Canadians see their country as much less divided across party lines. Only 44% think there are strong partisan conflicts. (The survey was conducted before Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called a [snap election](#) in August 2021.)

In Europe, majorities in France, Italy, Spain and Germany say there are strong conflicts between supporters of different political parties. A quarter or more in France and Italy see these tensions as very strong. Sweden and the Netherlands are among the least politically divided countries in this region, with 35% and 38% seeing strong conflicts, respectively.

While people in South Korea are the most likely in the Asia-Pacific region to see strong conflicts between different party backers, nearly seven-in-ten in Taiwan hold the same view. Relatively few in the rest of the region say there are strong partisan conflicts in their

Americans and Koreans see strong tensions between political parties

% who say that in (survey public), there are ___ conflicts between people who support different political parties



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q26a.
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society. Singaporeans feel particularly united when it comes to politics; 17% say there are no conflicts at all.

In many of the European countries surveyed, younger adults are more likely than those ages 65 and older to say there are strong conflicts between supporters of different political parties. Younger and older Greeks are especially divided. Only 39% of Greeks ages 65 and older think there are strong partisan tensions in their country, compared with 82% of Greeks ages 18 to 29.

Similar, though smaller, differences can also be seen in Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Outside of Europe, a third of older adults in Japan see their country as politically divided, compared with roughly half of those under 30.

Notably, there are very few differences by ideology or support for the governing party. In the U.S., for example, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are just as likely as Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents to think there are strong partisan tensions in the U.S. (both 90%).

There is a relatively strong correlation between perceptions of partisan conflict among the general public and the views of experts ($r=+0.72$). In publics where larger shares of survey respondents say there is tension between different party backers, experts generally report greater political polarization (according to the [V-Dem](#) political polarization measure, which quantifies the extent to which trained coders view each public as polarized into antagonistic political groups).

Younger Europeans see more conflict between political party supporters

*% who say that in (survey public), there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between people who support different political parties*

	18-29	30-49	50-64	65+	Youngest-oldest diff
	%	%	%	%	
Greece	82	50	40	39	+43
Germany	67	63	54	43	+24
Belgium	56	46	48	33	+23
Spain	69	63	52	49	+20
Italy	76	62	64	58	+18
Japan	51	40	36	33	+18
Netherlands	47	40	38	29	+18
Sweden	45	42	25	28	+17


Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a.
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Public views of political conflict generally align with expert ratings of polarization

% who say that in (survey public), there are **very strong/strong** conflicts between people who support different political parties

100%



Note: Political polarization data is from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) survey. For each society, local experts rated the extent to which the society is polarized into antagonistic, political camps. Responses ranged from 0 “Not at all. Supporters of opposing political samples generally interact in a friendly manner” to 4 “Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.” Scores for each society are created from the combined expert ratings.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26a. Political polarization data from V-Dem survey of experts, conducted March 2021. “Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies”

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Additionally, the share of people across the 17 publics surveyed who say there are very strong conflicts between supporters of different political parties is moderately correlated ($r=+0.59$) with the share of seats received by the second-largest party in an election. For example, in the 2020 election in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) received 54% of the seats in Taiwan’s legislature while the Kuomintang (KMT) – the second-largest party – received 34%, making for a relatively divided chamber. Roughly three-in-ten in Taiwan say there are very strong partisan conflicts in their society. Toward the other end of the spectrum, one can look at Japan, where the

ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 59% of seats in the House of Representatives in the 2017 election, while the second-largest party – the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) – received just 11%. In Japan, a much smaller share of the public describes very strong tensions between different party supporters (8%).

Perceived conflict between people with different ethnic or racial backgrounds


Many people across the 17 advanced economies surveyed see strong conflicts between people with different ethnic or racial backgrounds (a median of 48%). People in the U.S. (71%), France (64%) and Italy (57%) are particularly likely to view these tensions as strong, with around a quarter in each country who say they are *very* strong. While majorities in South Korea and Germany also say there are strong conflicts in their society, only around one-in-ten rate them as very strong.

In Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, people are more likely to say there are strong conflicts between people from different ethnic or racial backgrounds than between people who support different political parties. In Sweden, for example, while only 35% see their country as politically divided, 50% see tensions based on race or ethnicity.

In about half of the publics surveyed, women are more likely than men to say that there is friction between people from different ethnic backgrounds. For example, 49% of German men compared with 61% of German women hold this view. Similar gender differences are seen in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Taiwan.

Sizable shares in U.S., France and Italy see very strong ethnic conflicts

% who say that in (survey public), there are ___ conflicts between people with different ethnic or racial backgrounds



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26d.
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Overall, there are few ideological differences. In Germany, Sweden and Italy, those on the right of the ideological spectrum are more likely than those on the left to see strong conflicts between people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. This pattern is reversed in Greece and the U.S., with those on the left more likely to say that there are racial or ethnic tensions in their countries.

Consistent with the ideological differences in the U.S., Democrats (82%) are much more likely than Republicans (58%) to say there are strong conflicts based on race and ethnicity in their country. And Black Americans (82%) see more conflict between people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds than White (69%) and Hispanic Americans (70%).

Perceived conflict between people who practice different religions

Overall, fewer people see strong religious conflicts, compared with conflicts based on politics or race. A median of 36% across the 17 publics surveyed say there are strong conflicts between people who practice different religions in their society.


South Korea and France are the only places surveyed where more than half of people say there are strong divisions based on religious beliefs. And in France, almost a quarter say these conflicts are *very* strong.

Roughly half of Americans say there are strong conflicts between people who practice different religions in their country, including 13% who say there are very strong conflicts.

In Europe, people in Spain are by far the least likely to say there are strong religious tensions. Only 19% of Spaniards hold this view. More say that there are no conflicts between

Many do not see strong religious tensions in their society

% who say that in (survey public), there are ___ conflicts between people who practice different religions



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey, Q26e.
 "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

different religious groups at all in their country (30%).

Again, South Korea is an outlier in the Asia-Pacific region. Koreans are nearly twice as likely as those in Japan, which has the second-highest share in the region, to say there are religious tensions in their country. In contrast, roughly three-in-ten in Singapore and Taiwan say there are no religious conflicts at all.

Adults under 30 are more likely than those ages 65 and older to see strong religious divisions in Greece, Belgium, Japan, Italy, the U.S., Spain and Taiwan. And again, Greeks are the most polarized by age, with 60% of younger adults and 24% of older adults saying there are strong conflicts based on religion in their country.

Different kinds of religious conflict

The survey included two questions measuring perceived religious conflict: 1) conflict between people who practice different religions and 2) conflict between people who are religious and people who are not religious. The separate questions were included to determine if people viewed tensions between, for example, Christians and Muslims, as stronger or weaker than conflicts between people who identify with a religion and those who do not.

The differences between these two questions were negligible. In most countries, similar shares say there are strong conflicts between people who practice different religions and between those who are religious and those who are not. Across the 17 publics surveyed, the correlation between the questions was extremely high ($r=+0.97$). Considering the similarities between the questions, we focus on just one for our analysis: conflict between people who practice different religions.

However, perceptions of religious conflict differ somewhat by ideology in several countries. For example, conservatives in the U.S. are more likely to see strong conflicts between people who are religious and those who are not (50%) than between different religious groups (39%). Liberals respond nearly the same to both questions. And in Sweden, people on the left are less likely to see conflicts between people who are religious and those who are not (12%) than between different religious groups (26%).

In Germany, Canada and Italy, there are ideological divides in the extent to which people see conflicts between those who are religious and those who are not, with people on the right more likely to see conflicts than those on the left. But people on the left and right in these countries agree on the extent to which there are conflicts between different religious groups.

Perceived conflict between people who live in cities and people who live in rural areas

A median of just 23% say there are strong or very strong conflicts between people who live in cities and people who live in rural areas. Half say there are not very strong conflicts and 20% say there are no conflicts at all between these groups. (Medians are based on 16 publics. This question was not asked in Singapore, a geographically small island nation with an entirely urban population.)

Again, France, South Korea and the U.S. stand out as particularly divided. Roughly 45% in each country say there are strong or very strong tensions based on geography. Elsewhere, no more than three-in-ten share this sentiment.


Spaniards are the most likely to say that there are no conflicts at all between those who live in cities and those who live in rural areas (49%). In Europe, at least a quarter in Belgium, Italy and Greece say the same.

Similarly, many in the Asia-Pacific region – with the exception of South Korea – say there are not very strong or no conflicts based on what type of area people live in. Roughly one-in-five or more in New Zealand, Australia, Japan and Taiwan say there are no divisions at all between city-dwellers and people who live in rural areas.

People across the ideological spectrum tend to agree that there are limited conflicts based on the type of area people live in. In the U.S., however, people on the left (53%) are more likely than those on the right (38%) to say that there are strong or very strong conflicts between people who live in urban areas and people who live in rural areas.

Most do not see conflicts between those who live in urban vs. rural areas

% who say that in (survey public), there are ___ conflicts between people who live in cities and people who live in rural areas



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Question was not asked in Singapore.
 Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q26b.
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In six European countries – Belgium, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Greece – those with a secondary education or below are more likely than people with postsecondary education to say that there is friction based on where people live in their country. In the U.S., the opposite is true; people with more education are more likely than those with less to say there are strong conflicts between people in urban and rural areas.

Majorities of some publics say most people agree on basic facts


A median of 39% believe there are fundamental disagreements over basic facts in their society. In France and the U.S., about six-in-ten say most people in their country disagree over basic facts, while half or more also hold this view in Italy, Spain and Belgium. In contrast, roughly two-thirds or more in New Zealand, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Germany think most people agree on basic facts, even if they disagree about policies.

This high sense of disagreement over facts may be due, at least in part, to [struggles to combat](#) pandemic-related [conspiracy theories](#). In most places surveyed, those who believe COVID-19 has made their society more divided are much more likely to say people disagree over basic facts than those who say COVID-19 has made their society more united.

Perception of political conflicts is strongly tied to whether adults think their fellow citizens agree or disagree on basic facts. In every public surveyed, those who say there are very strong or strong conflicts between people who support different political parties are more likely to think people disagree on basic facts. This divide is largest in Sweden: 62% of Swedes who say there are political conflicts think most people disagree about basic facts,

Views vary internationally regarding whether people agree on basic facts

% who say when it comes to important issues facing (survey public), people may disagree over policies, but most people ___ on basic facts



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Question was not asked in Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.

Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q27. "Diversity and Division in Advanced Economies"

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compared with only 37% of Swedes who say there are not very strong or no conflicts between people who support different political parties.²

Views on the topic are closely related to views of the governing party or parties in each place surveyed. Outside of the U.S. and Italy, in every other public those with unfavorable views of the governing coalition are more likely to say most people disagree about basic facts than those with favorable views of the government.

² In the U.S., a different question posed in 2018 that asked specifically about whether Republicans and Democrats agree on basic facts found that there was a widespread sense that they did not.

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Appendix A: Demographic characteristics of the survey publics

Population distribution by type of region

% of population who live in a(n) ___ region, 2014

	Rural	Intermediate	Urban
	%	%	%
U.S.	37.7	20.2	42.1
Canada	27.4	16	56.6
Belgium	8.6	23.6	67.8
France	30.6	34.6	34.8
Germany	16.3	42.0	41.7
Greece	43.8	10.6	45.7
Italy	20.1	43.0	36.9
Netherlands	0.6	26.9	72.5
Spain	7.3	33.5	59.2
Sweden	15.9	61.6	22.6
UK	2.9	23.2	73.9
Australia	19.7	10.1	70.2
Japan	12.0	31.4	56.7
New Zealand	-	55.2	44.8
South Korea	17.2	13.1	69.6

Note: Data not available in Singapore and Taiwan. No regions in New Zealand are classified as "rural." For more on how the OECD classifies regions, see OECD's *Regions at a Glance 2016*.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Accessed September 2021.
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Political polarization index scores

V-Dem political polarization index scores

	Political polarization index score
U.S.	3.72
Canada	1.33
Belgium	0.82
France	2.69
Germany	1.38
Greece	2.36
Italy	3.15
Netherlands	1.24
Spain	2.21
Sweden	0.62
UK	2.20
Australia	2.84
Japan	1.23
New Zealand	0.45
Singapore	1.64
South Korea	2.71
Taiwan	1.79

Note: Political polarization data is from the V-Dem survey. For each society, local experts rated the extent to which the society is polarized into antagonistic, political camps. Responses ranged from 0 "Not at all. Supporters of opposing political samples generally interact in a friendly manner" to 4 "Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner." Scores for each society are created from the combined expert ratings.

Source: V-Dem survey of experts, conducted March 2021.
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Share of lower chamber seats by party

% of seats in the lower chamber won by the ___ in the most recent elections

	Largest party		Second-largest party	
		%		%
U.S.	Democratic Party	51.0	Republican Party	48.5
Canada	Liberal Party	46.4	Conservative Party	35.8
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	16.7	Flemish Interest	12.0
France	En Marche	53.4	Republicans	19.4
Germany	Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	28.2	Social Democratic Party (SPD)	21.6
Greece	New Democracy	52.7	Syriza	28.7
Italy	Center-right coalition	42.1	Five Star Movement (M5S)	35.9
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	22.0	Party for Freedom (PVV)	13.3
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)	34.3	People's Party	25.4
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)	28.7	Moderate Party	20.1
UK	Conservative Party	56.0	Labour Party	31.2
Australia	Liberal National Coalition	51.0	Australian Labor Party (ALP)	45.0
Japan	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	59.2	Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP)	11.4
New Zealand	Labour Party	54.2	National Party	27.5
Singapore	People's Action Party	89.3	Worker's Party	10.8
South Korea	Democratic Party	60.0	United Future Party	34.3
Taiwan	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	54.0	Kuomintang (KMT)	33.6

Note: In Canada and Germany, results are drawn from the 2019 and 2017 elections, respectively, as those were the most recent elections at the time of surveying. Data drawn from V-Dem variables v2ellostsl and v2ellostss and matched with party names from V-Party using variable v2paseatshare. In Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan, V-Dem data matched directly with election results to find party names.

Source: V-Dem Institute. Accessed September 2021.

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Estimated religious composition, 2020

Estimated % who are ... (2020)

	Christians	Muslims	Unaffiliated	Hindus	Buddhists	Folk religions	Other religions	Jews
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
U.S.	75.5	1.1	18.6	0.7	1.2	0.3	0.8	1.7
Canada	66.4	2.8	24.5	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1
Belgium	60.5	7.5	31.0	< 0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3
France	58.1	8.3	31.9	< 0.1	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.5
Germany	66.0	6.9	26.3	< 0.1	0.3	< 0.1	0.1	0.3
Greece	87.6	5.9	6.1	0.2	< 0.1	0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1
Italy	80.8	4.9	13.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	< 0.1	< 0.1
Netherlands	47.3	6.9	44.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
Spain	75.2	3.3	21.0	< 0.1	< 0.1	0.1	< 0.1	0.1
Sweden	63.0	6.5	29.0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.1
UK	59.1	6.1	31.2	1.6	0.6	0.1	0.8	0.4
Australia	61.7	3.0	28.6	1.7	2.9	0.7	0.9	0.5
Japan	1.8	0.2	60.0	< 0.1	33.2	0.4	4.5	< 0.1
New Zealand	52.9	1.6	39.6	2.5	1.9	0.5	0.8	0.2
Singapore	17.7	16.1	16.5	6.5	32.2	2.4	8.5	< 0.1
South Korea	30.1	0.3	46.6	< 0.1	21.9	0.8	0.2	< 0.1
Taiwan	5.8	< 0.1	13.7	< 0.1	21.2	43.8	15.5	< 0.1

Source: Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050."
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Ethnic and racial composition of the 17 advanced economies surveyed

% of total population

	Ethnic group	Share		Ethnic group	Share		Ethnic group	Share
		%			%			%
U.S.	White non-Hispanic	57.8	Belgium	Belgian	75.2	Australia	English	25.9
	Hispanic	18.7		Other	10.6		Australian Other (includes Australian Aboriginal)	25.4
	Black non-Hispanic	12.1	Germany	German Other/stateless/unspecified	86.3		Irish	7.5
	Asian	6.1		8.9	Scottish		6.4	
Canada*	Canadian	32.3	Greece	Greek	91.6	Unspecified	5.4	
	English	18.3	Netherlands	Dutch	76.9	Japan	Japanese	97.9
	Scottish	13.9		EU	6.4	New Zealand	European	64.1
	French	13.6	Spain	Spanish	84.8		Maori	16.5
	Irish	13.4		Other	12.3		Other	13.7
	German	9.6	Sweden	Swedish	80.3	Singapore	Chinese	74.3
	Chinese	5.1		Other	15.0	Malay	13.5	
	Other	51.6	UK	White	87.2	Indian	9.0	
							Taiwan	Han Chinese

*Percentages add up to more than 100% because respondents were able to identify more than one ethnic origin.

Note: Groups comprising less than 5% of total population not shown. No detailed information about ethnic origin is available for France, Italy and South Korea. U.S. data is drawn from the Census Bureau rather than the CIA World Factbook to account for people who identify as Hispanic. Greece data reflects citizenship because the Greek government does not collect data on ethnicity.

Source: CIA World Factbook Field Listing on Ethnic Groups and U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed September 2021.

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Appendix B: Political categorization

For this report, we grouped people into two political categories: those who support the governing political party (or parties) and those who do not. These categories were coded based on the party or parties in power at the time the survey was fielded, and on respondents' answers to a question asking them which political party, if any, they identified with in their survey public.³

In publics where multiple political parties govern in coalition (as in many European countries), survey respondents who indicated support for any parties in the coalition were grouped together. In Germany, for example, where the center-right CDU/CSU governed with the center-left SPD at the time of the survey, supporters of all three parties were grouped together. In publics where different political parties occupy the executive and legislative branches of government, the party holding the executive branch was considered the governing party.

Survey respondents who did not indicate support for any political party, or who refused to identify with one, were considered to be *not* supporting the government in power.

Below is a table that outlines the governing political parties in each survey public.

³ Governing parties were not updated to account for elections that occurred after the survey was fielded and resulted in a new party (or parties) serving in government. Language used to measure party identification varied public by public.

Appendix: Political categorization

Public	Governing political party(ies)
Australia	Liberal-National Party/Country Liberal Party/Liberal, National
Belgium	Ecologists (Ecolo), Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V), Green (Groen), Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD), Reformist Movement (MR), Socialist Party (PS), Vooruit (Socialist Party Different)
Canada	Liberal Party
France	En Marche
Germany	Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Greece	New Democracy (ND)
Italy	Democratic Party (PD), Five Star Movement (M5S), Forza Italia (FI), Free and Equal (LEU), Lega
Japan	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Komeito (NKP)
Netherlands	ChristianUnion*, Democrats 66 (D66), People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), The Christian Democratic Appeal
New Zealand	Labour Party, Green Party
Singapore	People's Action Party (PAP)
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), United Left (IU), We can / Podemos
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), Green Party
Taiwan	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
UK	Conservative Party
U.S.	Democratic Party

* ChristianUnion (ChristenUnie) left the governing coalition in the Netherlands on April 3, 2021. It is not considered part of the governing coalition after this date.

Note: South Korea was excluded from this analysis because party favorability is not asked. Only parties represented in the federal government are shown.

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Appendix C: Classifying European political parties

Classifying parties as populist

Although experts generally agree that populist political leaders or parties display high levels of anti-elitism, definitions of populism vary. We use three measures to classify populist parties: anti-elite ratings from the [2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey \(CHES\)](#), Norris' [Global Party Survey](#) and [The PopuList](#). We define a party as populist when at least two of these three measures classify it as such.

CHES, which was conducted from February to May 2020, asked 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration to evaluate the 2019 positions of 277 European political parties across all European Union member states. CHES results are regularly used by academics to classify parties with regard to their left-right ideological leanings, their key party platform positions and their degree of populism, among other things.

We measure anti-elitism using an average of two variables in the CHES data. First, we used “PEOPLE_VS_ELITE,” which asked the experts to measure the parties with regard to their position on direct vs. representative democracy, where 0 means that the parties support elected officeholders making the most important decisions and 10 means that “the people,” not politicians, should make the most important decisions. Second, we used “ANTI-ELITE_SALIENCE,” which is a measure of the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for that particular party, with 0 meaning not at all salient and 10 meaning extremely salient. The average of these two measures is shown in the table below as “anti-elitism.” In all countries, we consider parties that score at or above a 7.0 as “populist.”

The [Global Party Survey](#), which was conducted from November to December 2019, asked 1,861 experts on political parties, public opinion, elections and legislative behavior to evaluate the ideological values, issue position and populist rhetoric of parties in countries on which they are an expert, classifying a total of 1,051 parties in 163 countries. We used “TYPE_POPULISM,” which categorizes populist rhetoric by parties. We added only “strongly populist” parties using this measure. In Italy, experts were asked to categorize the Center-Right coalition instead of individual parties within the coalition. The coalition includes Lega and Forza Italia. For both parties, we have used the coalition rating of “strongly populist.”

The PopuList is an ongoing project to classify European political parties as populist, far right, far left and/or euroskeptic. [The project](#) specifically looks at parties that “obtained at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998.” It is based on collaboration

between academic experts and journalists. The PopuList classifies parties that emphasize the will of the people against the elite as populist.⁴

Reform UK, formerly the Brexit Party, is only classified as populist on one measure but is still included for analysis in the report. It is not included in the PopuList and does not meet our anti-elite CHES threshold of 7.0, but is considered a right-wing populist party by the Global Party Survey and [other experts](#).

Classifying parties as left, right or center

We can further classify these traditional and populist parties into three groups: left, right and center. When classifying parties based on ideology, we relied on the variable “LRGEN” in the CHES dataset, which asked experts to rate the positions of each party in terms of its overall ideological stance, with 0 meaning extreme left, 5 meaning center and 10 meaning extreme right. We define left parties as those that score below 4.5 and right parties as those above 5.5. Center parties have ratings between 4.5 and 5.5.

⁴ Mudde, Cas. 2004. “[The Populist Zeitgeist](#).” Government and Opposition.

European populist party classifications

Party	Country	2019 Left-right	2019 Anti-elitism	2019 Global Party Survey	The PopuList
Populist parties on the left					
La France Insoumise	France	1.3	8.3	Strongly populist	Populist
Podemos	Spain	1.9	7.7	--	Populist
Syriza	Greece	2.3	7.0	--	Populist
Populist parties in the center					
Five Star Movement (M5S)	Italy	4.8	9.2	Strongly populist	Populist
Populist parties on the right					
Forza Italia	Italy	6.9	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Reform UK*	UK	8.2	5.3	Strongly populist	--
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	8.5	7.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Party for Freedom (PVV)	Netherlands	8.7	9.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Lega	Italy	8.8	7.6	Strongly populist	Populist
Greek Solution	Greece	9.0	7.6	--	Populist
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Germany	9.2	9.0	Strongly populist	Populist
Forum for Democracy (FvD)	Netherlands	9.5	9.7	--	Populist
Flemish Interest	Belgium	9.6	8.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Vox	Spain	9.7	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
National Rally	France	9.8	8.6	Strongly populist	Populist

*Previously named the Brexit Party

Notes: Left-right indicates the average score CHES experts gave each party on an 11-point left-right scale. Scores for anti-elitism are an average of party position on direct vs. representative democracy and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within the party.

Source: CHES (2019). Global Party Survey (2019). The PopuList (2019).

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Methodology

Pew Research Center's Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on telephone interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup and Langer Research Associates. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. More details about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs are [available here](#). Results for the U.S. survey are based on data from the American Trends Panel.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted Feb. 1 to Feb. 7, 2021. A total of 2,596 panelists responded out of 2,943 who were sampled, for a response rate of 88%. This does not include one panelist who was removed from the data due to extremely high rates of refusal or straightlining. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 4%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 2%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 2,596 respondents is plus or minus 2.7 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a random, address-based sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in

2019 and 2020, respectively. Across these three address-based recruitments, a total of 17,161 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 15,134 (88%) agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 25,076 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 13,553 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	2,184
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	1,243
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	621
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS/web	9,396	8,778	5,903
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS/web	5,900	4,720	2,330
June 1 to July 19, 2020	ABS/web	1,865	1,636	1,272
	Total	36,879	25,076	13,553

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.⁵ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The sample was allocated according to the following strata, in order: tablet households, U.S.-born Hispanics, foreign-born Hispanics, high school education or less, foreign-born Asians, not registered to vote, people ages 18 to 34, uses internet weekly or less, non-Hispanic Black adults, nonvolunteers and all other categories not already falling into any of the above.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management

⁵ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data which was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was Feb. 1 to Feb. 7, 2021. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on Feb. 1, 2021.

On Feb. 1 and Feb. 2, invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on Feb. 1, 2021. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on Feb. 2, 2021.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch
Initial invitation	Feb. 1, 2021	Feb. 2, 2021
First reminder	Feb. 4, 2021	Feb 4, 2021
Final reminder	Feb. 6, 2021	Feb. 6, 2021

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of

leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, one ATP respondent was removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data was weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey (and the probability of being invited to participate in the panel in cases where only a subsample of

respondents were invited).

The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to

the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort. To correct for nonresponse to the initial recruitment surveys and gradual panel attrition, the base weights for all active panelists are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table to create a full-panel weight.

For ATP waves in which only a subsample of panelists are invited to participate, a wave-specific base weight is created by adjusting the full-panel weights for subsampled panelists to account for any differential probabilities of selection for the particular panel wave. For waves in which all active panelists are invited to participate, the wave-specific base weight is identical to the full-panel weight.

In the final weighting step, the wave-specific base weights for panelists who completed the survey are again calibrated to match the population benchmarks specified above. These weights are

Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender	2019 American Community Survey
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2019 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2017 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2016 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation	2020 National Public Opinion Reference Survey
Frequency of internet use	
Religious affiliation	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. The 2016 CPS was used for voter registration targets for this wave in order to obtain voter registration numbers from a presidential election year. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population. The 2020 National Public Opinion Reference Survey featured 1,862 online completions and 2,247 mail survey completions.

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trimmed (typically at about the 1st and 99th percentiles) to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and test of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Group	Unweighted sample size	Weighted %	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	2,596		2.7 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,287		3.7 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,106	44	3.9 percentage points
Half sample	At least 549		5.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,410	49	3.7 percentage points
Half sample	At least 688		5.2 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	2,596
Logged onto survey; broke off	2.12	41
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	23
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	282
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		1
Screened out		N/A
Total panelists in the survey		2,943
Completed interviews	I	2,596
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	346
Non-contact	NC	1
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		2,943
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		88%

Cumulative response rate	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	72%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 82	57%
Response rate to Wave 82 survey	88%
Cumulative response rate	4%

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey
October 13, 2021 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section and our [international survey methods database](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Since 2020, the Italy survey has been conducted by telephone; surveys were conducted face-to-face in 2002 and 2007-2019.
- In 2021, the Greece survey was conducted by telephone; all prior surveys in Greece were conducted face-to-face.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.