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# How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime

*Israelis are more pessimistic than optimistic about the future of their political system*

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## How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis covers Israeli attitudes toward the country's leaders, the current and future state of Israeli society, and the influence of various national institutions and groups, all in the context of the Israel-Hamas war.

The data is from a survey of 1,001 Israeli adults conducted face-to-face from March 3 to April 4, 2024. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew and Arabic, and the survey is representative of the adult population ages 18 and older, excluding those in East Jerusalem and non-sanctioned outposts. (The survey also did not cover the West Bank or Gaza.) The survey included an oversample of Arabs in Israel. It was subsequently weighted to be representative of the Israeli adult population with the following variables: gender by ethnicity, age by ethnicity, education, region, urbanicity and probability of selection of respondent.

Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures. For all reports beginning in 2024, totals are based on unrounded topline figures, so combined totals might be different than in previous years. Refer to the 2024 topline to see our new rounding procedures applied to past years' data.

Here are the [questions used for this report](#), along with responses, and the survey [methodology](#).

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# How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime


*Israelis are more pessimistic than optimistic about the future of their political system*

As the Israel-Hamas war rages on, the shares of Israelis who see deep conflicts *within* their society have lessened over the past year:

- 28% say there are very strong conflicts between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews, down from 46% in 2023.
- 18% say there are very strong conflicts between people who are religious and people who are not, down from 29%.
- 24% see very strong conflicts between those on the political left and right, down from 32% last year. *(Read more about conflicts in Israeli society in [Chapter 1.](#))*

## Some Israelis see very strong conflicts in their society, but fewer say this than a year ago

*% who say there are very strong conflicts between the following groups in Israel*



Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q88a-c. "How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime"

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### Research in the West Bank and Gaza

Pew Research Center has polled the Palestinian territories in previous years, but in our 2024 survey, we were unable to survey in Gaza or the West Bank due to security concerns. We are actively investigating possible ways to conduct both qualitative and quantitative research on public opinion in the region and will provide more data as soon as we are able.


At the same time, **Israeli public opinion has become more polarized in other ways.**

For example, Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis have increasingly diverging views on key institutions – such as the military – and on policy issues:


- Jewish Israelis trust the national government to do what is right for Israel *more* than they did in 2017 (61%, up from 53%). Arab Israelis trust it less (23%, down from 44%).
- 93% of Jewish Israelis think the military has a positive influence on the way things are going in Israel, while just 34% of Arab Israelis agree. This gap has grown significantly since we last asked the question in 2007, when 77% of Israeli Jews and 57% of Israeli Arabs said the military’s influence was positive. *(Read more about confidence in the government and institutions in [Chapter 2.](#))*
- Israelis as a whole are still divided over whether the building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank helps (40%) or hurts (35%) Israel’s security. But Jewish Israelis have grown more likely to see the settlements as *helping* security, widening the ethnic gap on this question. *(Read more about views of settlements in [Chapter 3.](#))*
- Fewer Israelis think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully than said the same last year (26%, down from 35%). Most of the decline comes from shifting opinions among Jewish Israelis. *(Read more about*

## Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs have been growing apart on key issues


% who trust the national government a lot/somewhat to do what is right for Israel




% who say the military has a very/somewhat good influence on the way things are going in Israel



% who say the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank helps the security of Israel



% who say a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other



Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q73a, 75, 84, 85.

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views of a two-state solution in our [previous report](#).)

Views among those on the ideological left and right have also diverged on some of these key issues since we last asked about them. For example, 19% of those who place themselves on the left trust the national government, compared with 75% of those on the right – a difference of 56 percentage points. In 2017, the difference was 43 points (26% on the left trusted the government, compared with 69% of those on the right).

Against this backdrop, **Israelis are more pessimistic (50%) than optimistic (35%) about the way their political system works.** And, whereas Arabs and Jews were about equally pessimistic about the political system in 2019, Arabs have become *more* pessimistic (69%, up from 57%) while Jews have become *less* so (44%, down from 55%).

**Israelis are also divided on the prospect of Arab and Jewish Israelis living together peacefully,** with

equal shares saying they are optimistic (37%) and pessimistic (37%) about this. About a quarter (23%) said they are both, neither or that it depends.


Still, Israelis are more optimistic than pessimistic about the country's national security and the ability of religious and secular Jews to live together peacefully.

**Related:** [Israeli Views of the Israel-Hamas War](#)

These are among the key findings of a survey of 1,001 Israelis, conducted via face-to-face interviews from March 3 to April 4, 2024.

### Israelis express a mix of optimism and pessimism about the future

% who say that, when thinking about the future of Israel, they feel generally \_\_\_ about the following areas



Note: Those who volunteered another response such as "Both," "Neither" or "It depends" and those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q76a-e. "How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime"

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## Views of political leaders

In March and early April, attitudes toward Israel’s political leadership were largely negative. (The survey took place before war cabinet member [Benny Gantz resigned from the government](#) and before Prime Minister Benajmin Netanyahu [disbanded the emergency war cabinet](#).)

**At the time of the survey, just one of the seven officials we asked about – Defense Minister [Yoav Gallant](#) – received favorable ratings from a clear majority of Israelis.**


Jewish and Arab Israelis had very different views of the six other Israeli politicians we asked about. The largest gaps were in evaluations of Gallant (Jews were 65 percentage points more favorable than Arabs); Mansour Abbas, the leader of the United Arab List, which is better known in Israel as Ra’am (-56); and Netanyahu (+44). Only Israeli opposition leader [Yair Lapid](#) was seen about equally favorably by Jews and Arabs (37% vs. 41%).

Ideological divides between the right and left were also large – particularly when it came to Netanyahu (those on the right were 61 points more favorable than those on the left), Ben-Gvir (+54) and Smotrich (+54).

*(Read more about views of Israeli leaders in [Chapter 1](#), and explore views of Palestinian leaders in our [previous report](#).)*

## Israeli Jews and Arabs diverge in their views of political leaders

% who had a **favorable** opinion of the following political leaders in spring 2024, by ethnicity



Note: The survey took place before Benny Gantz and his National Unity party resigned from the government and before Netanyahu disbanded the war cabinet.  
Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q5c-i.  
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
## Violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem

Around two-thirds of Israelis say they are extremely or very concerned about violence against Jews in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Around a third are similarly concerned about violence against Palestinians. But concerns differ dramatically by ethnicity:

- Jewish Israelis (70%) are more concerned than Arab Israelis (43%) about rising violence against Jews in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
- Arab Israelis (73%) are much more concerned than Jewish Israelis (19%) about violence against Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

### Israelis are concerned about increasing violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in light of the war

*% who are \_\_\_ concerned about the following in the West Bank and East Jerusalem*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
 Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q87c-d.  
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There are also ideological differences, with left-leaning Israelis expressing much more concern than right-leaning Israelis about violence against Palestinians and much less concern about violence against Jews.

### **Jewish religious groups in Israel: Haredim, Datiim, Masortim and Hilonim**

Nearly all Israeli Jews identify as Haredi (commonly translated as “ultra-Orthodox”), Dati (“religious”), Masorti (“traditional”) or Hiloni (“secular”). The spectrum of religious observance in Israel – on which Haredim are generally the most religious and Hilonim the least – does not always line up perfectly with Israel’s political spectrum. On some issues, including those pertaining to religion in public life, there is a clear overlap: Haredim are furthest to the right, and Hilonim are furthest to the left, with Datiim and Masortim in between. But on other political issues, including those related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and views of the United States, differences between religious groups do not always mirror those between people at different points on the ideological spectrum. Because of sample size considerations, we combine Haredim and Datiim for analysis in this report.

For more information on the different views of these religious groups, read the Center’s 2016 deep dive on the topic, [“Israel’s Religiously Divided Society.”](#)

*CORRECTION (August 8, 2024): This report, including graphics, has been updated to reflect that a survey question asked about violence against **Palestinians** in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, not violence against Arabs (as was previously reported). Also, a question about the ability of religious and secular people to live together peacefully asked about religious and secular **Jews**, not Israelis.*

## 1. How Israelis view their government, institutions and leaders

Adults in Israel are closely divided on whether they trust the national government to do what is right for the country, and just 35% are optimistic about the future of Israel’s political system. Institutions such as the military, police and Supreme Court are generally seen as having a positive influence on society, though these views vary significantly along ethnic and ideological lines.

At the time of the survey, taken before Gantz left the government and Netanyahu disbanded the war cabinet, most Israelis expressed negative attitudes toward their political leaders. Just one of the seven officials we asked about – Defense Minister Yoav Gallant – got favorable ratings from a clear majority of Israelis.

### Trust in the government

Israelis are quite divided over whether they trust the national government to do what is right for Israel, with 53% saying they trust it and 47% saying they do not. Israeli Jews are about three times as likely as Israeli Arabs to say they trust the national government (61% vs. 23%). Indeed, nearly four-in-ten Israeli Arabs (37%) say they do not trust it *at all*.


At present, Israelis on the ideological right are much more inclined to trust the national government (75%) than are those in the center (40%) or on the left (19%).

Among Jews, 88% of Haredim (“ultra-Orthodox” Jews) and Datiim (“religious” Jews) say they trust the national government to do what is right for Israel – more than double the 39% of Hilonim (“secular” Jews) who feel this way.

Israelis with a favorable view of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are also much more likely than those with an unfavorable view of him to express trust in the government (95% vs. 22%).

### Jewish Israelis trust the national government more than Arab Israelis do

% who trust the national government \_\_\_ to do what is right for Israel



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Haredi and Dati Jews could not be analyzed separately due to sample size. Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q75.

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Similarly, supporters of parties in Netanyahu’s coalition are much more confident in the national government than those who do not support the coalition (91% vs. 29%).

While the overall percentage of Israelis who express *at least some* trust in the government is unchanged since the question was last asked in 2017, both the share who trust the government *a lot* and the share who do not trust it *at all* have increased.

This polarization has occurred largely along ethnic lines: The share of Israeli Jews who say “A lot” has doubled (from 16% in 2017 to 32% in 2024), while the share of Israeli Arabs who say “Not at all” has more than doubled (from 15% to 37%).

### Influence of various groups and organizations in Israeli society


As the Israel-Hamas war continues, most Israelis (81%) say the military has a very or somewhat good influence on the way things are going in Israel. This is greater than the share who say the same about any other institution or group asked about in the survey. Religious leaders got the lowest rating (51% say they have a good influence).

By roughly two-to-one, more Israelis say the Supreme Court has a good influence than a bad influence on the way things are going in Israel. This follows [major protests in 2023](#) in response to Netanyahu’s plan to reform the judiciary.

Other actors in Israeli life – such as large foreign companies, the police, the media, social media, and banks and other major financial institutions – are generally seen to have a positive influence as well.

#### Amid the war against Hamas, about 8 in 10 Israelis say the military has a good influence on Israel

*% who say the following groups or organizations have a \_\_\_ influence on the way things are going in Israel*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. The full question about “the media” referenced television, radio, newspapers and magazines.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q73a-i. “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

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However, views of many of these institutions and groups tend to differ depending on the respondent’s ethnicity, political ideology and level of religious observance.

**Views by ethnicity**

Jewish Israelis are more likely than Arab Israelis to say the military, foreign companies and the police have a very or somewhat good influence on the way things are going in Israel. The 59-point difference in views of the military is especially striking: 93% of Jews say the Israeli military has a good influence, while just 34% of Arabs agree.


This gap has grown since we last asked the question in 2007. Then, 77% of Jews and 57% of Arabs said the military had a good influence. In other words, there has been a 23-point *decrease* among Arabs and a 16-point *increase* among Jews in positive views of the military since 2007.

Arabs are more likely than Jews to say the media has a positive influence on Israeli life (79% vs. 60%). (The survey was conducted prior to [Israel shutting down Al Jazeera’s operations in the country.](#)) And Arabs are more likely than Jews to say social media has a positive influence (63% vs. 50%).

Jews and Arabs do not differ significantly in their evaluations of the influence that religious leaders, the Supreme Court, and banks and other major financial institutions have on the way things are going in Israel.

**Jewish and Arab Israelis disagree on whether the military, police and media have a good influence**

*% who say the following groups or organizations have a **very/somewhat good influence** on the way things are going in Israel, by ethnicity*



Note: Statistically significant differences are in **bold**. The full question about “the media” referenced television, radio, newspapers and magazines.  
 Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q73a-i.  
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**Views by ideology**

There are large differences across the ideological spectrum on the influence of various institutions and groups in Israel.

The gap between adults on the ideological right and left is particularly large when it comes to attitudes toward religious leaders. Roughly three-quarters of those on the right say religious leaders have a positive influence on the way things are going in Israel, compared with about a quarter each among those in the center and on the left.


We also see gaps greater than 30 points between the shares of Israelis on the right and left who say the military and the police have a positive influence.

The direction of the gap is reversed regarding the positive influence of social media (-29 points on the right), the media (-27) and the Supreme Court (-25).

Attitudes about the Supreme Court’s influence stand out: Israelis on the left and in the center are equally likely to say it’s positive (75% each), compared with 50% of those on the right.

**Israelis are divided ideologically about the influence of religious leaders, the military and the police**

*% who say the following groups or organizations have a **very/somewhat good influence** on the way things are going in Israel, by ideology*



Note: Statistically significant differences are in **bold**. The full question about “the media” referenced television, radio, newspapers and magazines.  
 Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q73a-i.  
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**Views by Jewish religious observance**

Among Jews, those who self-identify with the highly religious categories – Haredim and Datiim – overwhelmingly say religious leaders have a positive influence on how things are going in Israel.


Overall, 98% of Haredi/Dati Jews say this, with 82% saying religious leaders have a *very* positive influence. Most Masortim, or “traditional” Jews, agree (61%). Among Hilonim, or “secular” Jews, just 18% say religious leaders have a positive influence on life in Israel.

The pattern is the opposite when it comes to the influence of social media and the

Supreme Court. Just over half or more of Hiloni (64%) and Masorti (54%) Jews say social media has a positive influence, compared with 26% of Haredi/Dati Jews. Similarly, roughly three-quarters of Hilonim (76%) say the Supreme Court has a positive influence, compared with about half or fewer among Masortim (49%) and Haredim/Datiim (45%).

**Haredi and Dati Jews overwhelmingly say religious leaders have good influence on life in Israel**

*% who say religious leaders have a **very/somewhat good influence** on the way things are going in Israel*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Haredi and Dati Jews could not be analyzed separately due to sample size.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q73e.

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## Views of Israeli political leadership

Israelis had generally dim views of most political leaders we asked about in our March 3-April 4 survey (which preceded the [dissolution of Israel's war cabinet](#)).

Some members of the war cabinet were seen favorably by about half of the public or more. But Netanyahu, members of his governing coalition and those in the opposition were much less popular.


Among the political leaders asked about, Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant was the most popular: 61% had a very or somewhat favorable view of him. About half felt similarly about former war cabinet member Benny Gantz, who left the opposition to help form the [emergency unity government](#) shortly after the war with Hamas began. (The survey also took place before [Gantz resigned from the government](#).)

Netanyahu, the chair of the former war cabinet, was the least popular of its members. Approximately four-in-ten Israelis had a favorable view of him (41%), while a 58% majority had an unfavorable view of the longtime prime minister.

Other members of Netanyahu's right-wing coalition received even less support. A third of the Israeli public had a favorable view of Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. A similar share (36%) favored Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich. Larger shares saw them in a negative light – in fact, 45% and 41% of Israelis expressed *very* unfavorable views of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, respectively. (The survey was conducted before the two leaders threatened to collapse the government [if Netanyahu accepted U.S. President Joe Biden's cease-fire proposal](#).)

### Israelis regard many of their political leaders poorly

% who had a \_\_\_ opinion of the following political leaders in spring 2024



Note: The survey took place before Benny Gantz and his National Unity party resigned from the government and before Netanyahu dissolved the war cabinet.

Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q5c-i. "How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime"

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The Israeli opposition was also unpopular with the public. Its leader, Yair Lapid, was favored by 38% of Israelis. Most (57%) had an unfavorable view of him.

Mansour Abbas, leader of United Arab List (a conservative party better known in Israel as Ra'am), was seen favorably by 20% of Israelis. About three-quarters of the public (76%) thought unfavorably of him.

Views of Israeli politicians differed by ethnicity, Jewish religious observance and political ideology.

### **Views by ethnicity**

The biggest differences between Arab and Jewish Israelis on this question were in opinions of Gallant and Abbas. More than seven-in-ten Jews rated Gallant favorably, while only 9% of Arabs did the same. In the case of Abbas, 64% of Arab Israelis favored him, compared with only 8% of Jewish Israelis.

Views were closest on Lapid, leader of centrist party Yesh Atid. He was seen favorably by 41% of Arabs and 37% of Jews.

Generally speaking, [politicians belonging to the Israeli right](#) – Ben-Gvir, Gallant, Netanyahu and Smotrich – received very little support from Israeli Arabs.

### **Views by Jewish religious observance**

Majorities of Haredi and Dati Jews had favorable views of Ben-Gvir (77%) and Smotrich (78%). Netanyahu was seen favorably by an even larger share of Haredim and Datiim (88%).

Secular Jews expressed generally low favorability of these leaders. Among Hilonim, about one-in-five or fewer had a positive opinion of Netanyahu (21%), Abbas (17%) or Smotrich (17%). Only 13% saw Ben-Gvir in a positive light.

Hilonim had more favorable views than Haredim/Datiim when it came to Gantz (76% vs. 32%) and Lapid (61% vs. 11%).

**Views by ideology**

Gallant was rated favorably by three-quarters of Israelis on the ideological right, making him the most popular politician among right-leaners at the time of the survey.


Smaller majorities of right-leaning Israelis had favorable views of Netanyahu (69%), Smotrich (61%) and Ben-Gvir (58%).

Among Israelis on the ideological left, fewer than 10% gave favorable ratings to Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu and Smotrich. Of the seven leaders asked about, left-leaners viewed Lapid most favorably (66%).

Israelis in the center thought most favorably of Gantz (71%) and Gallant (61%), and over half of them favored Lapid (56%). Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu and Smotrich were each seen favorably by a fifth of Israelis in the center or fewer.

**Israelis are ideologically split in their views of their political leaders**

*% who had a favorable opinion of the following political leaders in spring 2024, by ideology*



Note: The survey took place before Benny Gantz and his National Unity party resigned from the government and before Netanyahu disbanded the war cabinet.

Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q5c-i.

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*(Read about Israeli views of Palestinian leaders in our [previous report](#).)*

## 2. Societal conflicts and optimism about peaceful coexistence

Israelis generally describe their society as one rife with divisions. More than half say there are strong or very strong conflicts between people who are religious and people who are not religious (56%), between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis (61%), and between those on the political left and right (69%).


Still, the shares who see conflicts between these groups have mostly fallen [since last year](#) – as have the shares who see each conflict as *very strong*.

And although Israelis are broadly optimistic about the ability of religious and secular Jews to live together, they are much less sure about the ability of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs to live together peacefully.

We’ve also [previously reported](#) that a declining share of Israelis now think it’s possible for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with one another.

### Israelis see multiple conflicts in their society

% who say there are \_\_\_ conflicts between the following groups in Israel



Note: Those who answered “Not very strong,” “There are no conflicts” or did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April. 4, 2024. Q88a-c. “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

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## Ideological, ethnic and religious conflicts among Israelis

### Conflicts between the political left and right

More Israelis say there are conflicts between those on the left and right (69%) than say the same of the other groups asked about – and 24% describe these political conflicts as *very* strong. Last year, 74% saw at least strong political conflicts, including 32% who said they were very strong.

Jews are much more likely than Arabs to say there are political conflicts in Israeli society (76% vs. 42%). Interestingly, this marks one of the few issues on which Israelis on the left and right agree, with both groups about equally likely to say that there are strong divides between them.

### Conflicts between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis

Around six-in-ten adults in Israel (61%) perceive conflicts between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis, down from 72% last year. This is the largest decrease on any of the three conflicts asked about. And only 28% now say ethnic conflicts are *very* strong, down from 46%.

Israeli Arabs (58%) and Israeli Jews (61%) are equally likely to say there are at least strong conflicts between their two groups. Last year Jewish Israelis were more likely than Arab Israelis to see *very* strong ethnic conflicts, but today they are equally likely to hold this opinion (27% vs. 30%).

People who do not think an independent Palestinian state can coexist peacefully with Israel are more likely than those who think this is possible to see societal conflicts between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis (71% vs. 54%).

### Conflicts between people who are religious and people who are not

A slim majority of Israelis (56%) say there are conflicts between the religious and nonreligious segments of the population, including 18% who say these are *very* strong conflicts. Last year, six-in-ten Israelis saw conflicts between religious and nonreligious people, including 29% who said the conflicts were very strong.

Jews (59%) are more likely than Arabs (43%) to see these as strong conflicts. Among Jews, Hilonim are more likely than Masortim or Haredim/Datiim to describe them as such.

## Optimism about future relations

### Religious and secular Jews living together

By more than two-to-one, Israelis are more optimistic (56%) than pessimistic (20%) about the ability of religious and secular Jews to live together peacefully. Around one-in-five volunteer another response such as “Both,” “Neither” or “It depends.”


Israeli Jews are relatively more optimistic about this than Israeli Arabs are (62% vs. 33%). But this is related in large part to Arabs being more likely to say they are unsure or to volunteer an alternate response on this question, rather than because they are more pessimistic.

Among Jews, Haredim and Datiim (79%) and Masortim (75%) are much more optimistic than Hilonim (45%) about coexistence between religious and secular Jews in Israel. Israelis on the ideological right (71%) are also much more optimistic than those in the center (50%) or on the left (31%).

Adults who perceive very strong conflicts between religious people and nonreligious people are much less optimistic about a future of peaceful coexistence for religious and secular Jews than are those who see less strong conflicts (38% vs. 61%).

### Religious Jews in Israel are more optimistic about the future of their relations with secular Jews

*% who say that, when thinking about the future, they feel generally \_\_\_ about the ability of religious and secular Jews to live together peacefully*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Haredi and Dati Jews could not be analyzed separately due to sample size.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q76d. “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

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### Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews living together

Israelis are significantly less optimistic when it comes to the ability of Jews and Arabs to live together peacefully in Israel: Equal shares report optimism and pessimism (37% each), with 23% volunteering some other response such as “Both,” “Neither” or “It depends.”


This is an area where Jewish and Arab Israelis agree: They are similarly likely to be optimistic – and to be pessimistic – about peaceful future relations between their two groups.

Israelis who place themselves on the ideological left are somewhat more optimistic than those on the right (44% vs. 33%). Among Israelis in the center, 40% are optimistic.

Those who perceive very strong conflicts between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs are somewhat less optimistic than those who see less strong conflicts (31% vs. 40%).

### Israelis are split on the question of peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Israel

*% who say that, when thinking about the future, they feel generally \_\_\_ about the ability of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs to live together peacefully*



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Haredi and Dati Jews could not be analyzed separately due to sample size.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q76e. “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

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## Palestinian statehood and coexistence

Around a quarter of Israelis (26%) think that a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other. Half think this is not possible, while another 20% say it depends.

The feeling that peaceful coexistence is possible has decreased 9 percentage points since last year and 24 points since we first began asking the question in 2013.

Notably, nearly all of this decline is due to shifting opinions among Jewish Israelis. Today, 19% of Jews


think peaceful coexistence is possible, down from 32% [who said the same in 2023](#). In contrast, Arab Israelis have grown slightly *more* optimistic about peaceful coexistence – 49% say it’s possible, up from 41% last year.

Opinion about peaceful coexistence also differs across the ideological spectrum: 60% of Israeli adults who place themselves on the left think it’s possible, compared with 33% of those in the center and 8% of those on the right. The shift from last year has been particularly extreme for those in the center: The share optimistic about coexistence fell 20 points, compared with a drop of 13 points on the left and 6 points on the right.

([Read more about views of a two-state solution in our previous report.](#))

### Israeli Jews less likely to say peaceful coexistence with an independent Palestinian state is possible

% who think a way *can* be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other



Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q85. "How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime"

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## Optimism about Israel’s political system

Fewer Israelis say they are optimistic (35%) than pessimistic (50%) about the way the country’s political system works, with the remaining 15% volunteering some other response such as “Both,” “Neither” or “It depends.”

Israeli Jews are almost evenly split on whether they are optimistic (40%) or pessimistic (44%) about the political system – though they are significantly more optimistic than Israeli Arabs (15%). About seven-in-ten Arabs (69%) say they are *pessimistic* about the future of the political system in Israel.


People on the right are also more optimistic (47%) than those in the center (25%) or on the left (21%). Relatedly, Israelis with positive views of Netanyahu and his governing coalition also express more optimism about the political system in general than do those with unfavorable views.

People who think there are very strong conflicts between secular and religious Jews in Israel are more likely to say they are pessimistic about the political system than are those who see less strong conflicts (60% vs. 47%), although those who say these conflicts are not very strong are less likely to offer a response on this question.

By way of comparison, we also polled Israelis on their [optimism about Israel’s national security](#) and on future relations between different groups in Israeli society (explored in depth in [Chapter 2](#)

### Israelis are more pessimistic than optimistic about the future of their political system

% who say that, when thinking about the future of Israel, they feel generally \_\_\_ about the way their political system works



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Haredi and Dati Jews could not be analyzed separately due to sample size.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q76a. “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

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of this report). Of all the issues Israelis were asked about, the future of their country's political system is far and away the topic on which they feel the most pessimistic.

### 3. Settlements and violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem

Though the war against Hamas has been taking place in Gaza, violence has also increased in the West Bank, [according to the United Nations](#). Israelis are broadly concerned about this: 65% say they are extremely or very concerned about increasing violence against Jews in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 31% say the same about violence against Palestinians. But Jewish and Arab Israelis differ over which group is the focus of their concern.

When it comes to Jewish settlements in the West Bank, 40% of the public say they help Israeli national security, while 35% say they hurt. An additional 21% think settlements don't make much difference to the country's security.

# Israelis divided over whether Jewish settlements in the West Bank help or hurt Israeli security

Israel has [continued to plan for new West Bank settlements](#) in recent months – a move that prompted the Biden administration to declare in February that these settlements are “illegitimate” under international law, [citing a 50-year-old U.S. State Department opinion](#).


Israelis are divided on the effect of continuing to construct settlements in the West Bank: 40% say they help Israeli security, 35% say they hurt, and 21% say they don’t make a difference. (The remainder are unsure or decline to answer.)

Jewish Israelis are much more likely than Arab Israelis to view settlements as helping the country’s security (49% vs. 8%). Indeed, two-thirds of Israeli Arabs say these settlements *hurt* Israeli security – a position also taken by 26% of Israeli Jews.

Highly religious Jews in Israel tend to think that settlements contribute to the country’s security, but secular Jews are more likely to say settlements hurt security. Among self-identified Haredim (“ultra-Orthodox” Jews) and Datiim (“religious” Jews), 85% say that the continued building of settlements helps Israeli security, and 57% of Masortim (“traditional” Jews) agree.

## Israelis largely divided about the security impact of West Bank settlements

% who say the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank \_\_\_ (to) the security of Israel



Among those who think a way \_\_\_ be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other

Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Haredi and Dati Jews could not be analyzed separately due to sample size.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q84. “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

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Among Hilonim (“secular” Jews), just 21% say settlements help security, while a 47% plurality view settlements as harmful in this regard. Both Masortim and Hilonim are less likely to offer opinions on this question than Haredim or Datiim.


Israeli adults who place themselves on the ideological right are particularly likely to view settlements as helping Israel’s security (68%), while those in the center (17%) and on the left (9%) are much less likely to share this viewpoint. Among those on the left, about seven-in-ten say the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank hurts Israeli security.

People who think that Israel and an independent Palestinian state *can* coexist peacefully are particularly likely to say that settlements *hurt* Israeli security (71%). Those who doubt that a way can be found for two states to coexist peacefully are much more inclined to see settlements as *helping* Israeli security (60%).

Among the Israeli public overall, the view that settlements enhance security has increased 13 points since we first asked this question in 2013. Over that same 11-year period, the share of Israeli Jews who think building settlements helps Israel’s security has steadily grown. The share of Israeli Arabs who agree has fluctuated a bit but has consistently stayed under 10%.

### Jewish Israelis increasingly see settlements as helping Israel’s security, while a growing share of Arab Israelis say they make no difference to security

% who say the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.  
 Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3- April 4, 2024. Q84.  
 “How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime”

## Violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem

Since Oct. 7, there have been myriad reports of [violence against Palestinians](#) in the West Bank, with some of these events resulting in [sanctions by the U.S. government](#) against individual settlers accused of committing attacks. And according to an [Israeli human rights group](#) and [Human Rights Watch](#), rates of violence and death in the West Bank are at a historic high.

There also have been reports of [violence against Jewish settlers](#) in the West Bank, and more Israelis say they are extremely or very concerned about rising violence against Jews (65%) than against Palestinians (31%) in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.


However, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs differ sharply in their assessments:

- Jewish Israelis are much more likely than Arab Israelis to express concern about rising violence *against Jews* in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (70% vs. 43%), though Arab Israelis are less likely to offer an opinion on this question.
- Arab Israelis are much more likely than Jewish Israelis to express concern about rising violence *against Palestinians* in these areas (73% vs. 19%).

There are also ideological differences, with left-leaning Israelis 43 points more likely than right-leaning Israelis to voice concern about violence against Palestinians – and 20 points less likely to voice concerns about violence against Jews.

### Israelis are concerned about increasing violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in light of the war

% who are \_\_\_ concerned about the following in the West Bank and East Jerusalem



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of Israeli adults conducted March 3-April 4, 2024. Q87c-d. "How Israeli Society Has Unified, and Divided, in Wartime"

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Survey respondents who say Jewish settlements help Israeli security are significantly more concerned about rising violence against Jews when compared with those who think settlements hurt security (75% vs. 56%). But those who see settlements as helping security are *less* concerned about violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem than those who say they hurt security (16% vs. 54%).

Israelis were also asked about their concerns about the war going on for a long time and expanding into other countries. Read more about these concerns in our previously published report, [“Israeli Views of the Israel-Hamas War.”](#)

## Acknowledgments

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## Methodology

### Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey

Pew Research Center's survey in Israel was conducted as a part of the Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey. Results for the Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey are based on telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Langer Research Associates, Social Research Centre and Verian. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. More details about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs are [available here](#).

## Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center**  
**Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey**  
**June 20, 2024 Release**

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the Methodology section and our [international survey methods database](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures. Going forward, totals will be based on unrounded topline figures, so combined totals might be different than in previous years.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2024 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

*CORRECTION (August 8, 2024): This report, including graphics, has been updated to reflect that a survey question asked about violence against **Palestinians** in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, not violence against Arabs (as was previously reported). Also, a question about the ability of religious and secular people to live together peacefully asked about religious and secular **Jews**, not Israelis.*

		Q5c. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? c. Benjamin Netanyahu							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	41	58	20	21	19	39	1	100
	Spring, 2023	47	52	29	18	16	36	1	100
	Spring, 2017	52	46	18	34	30	16	2	100
	Spring, 2015	68	31	26	42	24	6	2	100
	Spring, 2013	56	42	14	42	31	11	2	100

		Q5d. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? d. Yair Lapid							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	38	57	9	29	25	32	5	100
	Spring, 2023	36	62	16	20	27	34	3	100

		Q5e. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? e. Itamar Ben-Gvir							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	33	64	10	23	18	45	3	100

		Q5f. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? f. Benny Gantz							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	51	44	17	34	25	20	4	100

		Q5g. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? g. Yoav Gallant							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	61	34	20	41	18	17	5	100

		Q5h. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? h. Mansour Abbas							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	20	76	7	13	18	57	4	100

		Q5i. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of ...? i. Bezalet Smotrich							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	36	62	16	20	21	41	2	100

		Q73a. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? a. The military							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	81	15	56	25	7	8	4	100
	Spring, 2007	74	24	24	50	18	6	2	100

		Q73b. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? b. The media – such as television, radio, newspapers and magazines							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	65	32	20	45	24	8	3	100
	Spring, 2007	57	42	15	42	26	16	1	100

		Q73d. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? d. The supreme court							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	61	34	26	35	19	15	5	100

		Q73e. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? e. Religious leaders							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	51	42	28	24	25	17	7	100
	Spring, 2007	46	49	10	36	31	18	5	100

		Q73f. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? f. The police							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	68	29	34	34	16	13	3	100

		Q73g. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? g. Large companies from other countries							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	72	16	21	50	13	3	12	100
	Spring, 2007	69	22	17	52	17	5	9	100

		Q73h. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? h. Banks and other major financial institutions							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	57	36	17	40	29	7	7	100

		Q73i. Do each of the following groups or organizations have a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad influence in (survey country)? i. Social media – such as Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, TikTok, Telegram and Twitter, recently renamed X							
		TOTAL Good	TOTAL Bad	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	53	40	14	39	25	15	7	100

		Q75. How much do you trust the national government to do what is right for (survey country) – a lot, some, not too much or not at all?							
		TOTAL Trust	TOTAL Do not trust	A lot	Some	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	53	47	26	27	24	23	1	100
	Spring, 2017	51	47	14	37	33	14	2	100

		Q76a. Thinking about the future of (survey country), please tell me whether you feel generally optimistic or generally pessimistic about the following areas. How about ...? a. The way our political system works				
		Optimistic	Pessimistic	Both/Neither/It depends (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	35	50	15	1	100
	Spring, 2019	35	56	6	3	100

		Q76d. Thinking about the future of (survey country), please tell me whether you feel generally optimistic or generally pessimistic about the following areas. How about...? d. The ability of religious and secular Jews to live together peacefully				
		Optimistic	Pessimistic	Both/Neither/It depends (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	56	20	19	5	100

		Q76e. Thinking about the future of (survey country), please tell me whether you feel generally optimistic or generally pessimistic about the following areas. How about ...? e. The ability of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs to live together peacefully				
		Optimistic	Pessimistic	Both/Neither/It depends (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	37	37	23	2	100

		Q84. In your opinion, does the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank help the security of Israel, hurt the security of Israel, or does it not make a difference?				
		Helps the security of Israel	Hurts the security of Israel	Does not make a difference	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	40	35	21	4	100
	Spring, 2017	35	40	21	3	100
	Spring, 2013	27	42	23	8	100

		Q87c. Thinking about the war between Israel and Hamas, how concerned are you about the possibility of each of the following? c. Increasing violence against Jews in the West Bank and East Jerusalem								
		TOTAL Concerned	TOTAL Not concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	65	9	17	48	24	6	3	2	100

		Q87d. Thinking about the war between Israel and Hamas, how concerned are you about the possibility of each of the following? d. Increasing violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem								
		TOTAL Concerned	TOTAL Not concerned	Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	31	47	13	18	20	18	29	3	100

		Q88a. In all countries, there are differences or conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in (survey country), are the conflicts very strong, strong, not very strong or are there no conflicts at all between...? a. People who are religious and people who are not religious							
		TOTAL Conflicts	TOTAL No conflicts	Very strong conflicts	Strong conflicts	Not very strong conflicts	There are no conflicts at all	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	56	42	18	38	36	6	2	100
	Spring, 2023	60	39	29	32	30	9	0	100

		Q88b. In all countries, there are differences or conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in (survey country), are the conflicts very strong, strong, not very strong or are there no conflicts at all between...? b. Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis							
		TOTAL Conflicts	TOTAL No conflicts	Very strong conflicts	Strong conflicts	Not very strong conflicts	There are no conflicts at all	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	61	39	28	33	34	5	1	100
	Spring, 2023	72	28	46	25	22	7	0	100

		Q88c. In all countries, there are differences or conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in (survey country), are the conflicts very strong, strong, not very strong or are there no conflicts at all between...? c. People on the political left and people on the political right							
		TOTAL Conflicts	TOTAL No conflicts	Very strong conflicts	Strong conflicts	Not very strong conflicts	There are no conflicts at all	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2024	69	29	24	45	25	4	2	100
	Spring, 2023	74	24	32	43	23	1	1	100