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Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid

Democrats and Republicans differ over how active the U.S. should be in world affairs and which country poses the greatest threat

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How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to measure Americans' opinions on how the U.S. should engage with and provide aid to other countries. The report also examines how Americans see the United States' global standing and how they view other countries. This analysis builds on the Center's previous study of Americans' opinions on the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day, including [major world conflicts](#) and [trade and tariffs](#).

For this analysis, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are [the questions used](#) for this analysis, along with [responses](#), and its [methodology](#).

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Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid

Democrats and Republicans differ over how active the U.S. should be in world affairs and which country poses the greatest threat


A new Pew Research Center survey finds substantial public support for several forms of U.S. foreign aid.

Around eight-in-ten Americans say the United States should provide medicine and medical supplies, as well as food and clothing, to people in developing countries. Roughly six-in-ten believe the U.S. should give aid that supports economic development and helps strengthen democracy in other nations. There is less support, however, for providing military aid or funding art and cultural activities.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are consistently more supportive of foreign aid than Republicans and Republican leaners. Still, majorities of Republicans say the U.S. should give developing nations medicine and medical supplies, along with food and clothing. And more than four-in-ten Republicans support aid meant to boost economic development and strengthen democracy.

Partisan gaps on different types of U.S. foreign aid

% who say the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of ___, by party



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
 "Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid"

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The survey was conducted after President Donald Trump and his administration [ended most activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development \(USAID\)](#).

In general, 45% of U.S. adults disapprove of ending most USAID programs, while 35% approve. (For more, read [“Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews.”](#))

The new survey also finds that Democrats and Republicans hold different views about the value of international engagement and cooperation.


For instance, when asked which comes closer to their opinion – “It’s best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs” or “We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home” – 62% of Democrats choose the former. In contrast, 67% of Republicans favor a domestic focus.

A majority of Americans (64%) say the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries when dealing with major international issues, even if it means making compromises. This compares with 34% who say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when other countries strongly disagree.


Around eight-in-ten Democrats (83%) think the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries. Republicans are divided: 47% say the U.S. should consider other countries, while 52% say it should follow its own interests.

Views on international engagement and cooperation

% who say ...



% who say that when dealing with major international issues, the U.S. should ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

“Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid”

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
Which nation poses the greatest threat to the U.S.?

When asked to name the country they believe poses the greatest threat to the U.S. in an open-ended question, 42% of Americans say China, while 25% say Russia. No other country is named by more than 5% of adults, and roughly a quarter say either that they are not sure or that no country poses the greatest threat.

Responses to this question have shifted somewhat since we last asked it two years ago. In 2023, both Republicans and Democrats named China as the top threat to the U.S. That's still the case among Republicans (a 58% majority name China), but Democrats now say Russia is the greatest threat (39% vs. 28% who name China).

Republicans still say China poses the greatest threat to the U.S., but Democrats now point to Russia

% who say ___ is the country that poses the greatest threat to the U.S. [open-end]



Note: Those who named other countries are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Do Americans have positive or negative views of major countries?

We also asked respondents whether they have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of several countries and international organizations, including the European Union.

The countries receiving the highest ratings are the six that, along with the U.S., compose the G7: Japan, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Over six-in-ten rate each of these countries favorably, including roughly half or more among both Democrats and Republicans.


Americans also give the EU generally positive ratings.

In contrast, few see China (21%), Russia (13%) or Iran (10%) positively.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to rate most countries we asked about favorably. Republicans, however, are more than twice as likely as Democrats to [give Israel a positive rating](#) (62% vs. 29%). The only other country that Republicans rate more highly than Democrats is Russia (16% vs. 9%).

Americans have positive views of G7 allies

% who have a **favorable** opinion of each, by party



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Which countries are gaining or losing influence?

We also asked respondents whether they believe the influence of certain countries has been getting stronger, getting weaker or staying about the same in recent years. Americans are more likely to say their own country is losing influence than they are to say this about any other nation.

Roughly half of Americans (52%) say the influence of the U.S. has been getting weaker in recent years, including 67% of Democrats and 37% of Republicans. Partisan views are essentially reversed from last year: In 2024, 67% of Republicans said the United States' influence has been declining, compared with 44% of Democrats.

Far fewer Americans overall say U.S. influence is getting *stronger*, though the share who feel this way has grown since last year (22% vs. 14% in 2024).

In their assessments of other countries, Americans are particularly likely to believe


China is gaining influence in world affairs (73%). Nearly half say Russia's influence is getting stronger, while roughly four-in-ten say this about Israel.

Perceptions of Iran, which has suffered a number of military and strategic setbacks over the past year, have changed since 2024. More Americans think Iran's influence is waning (28% vs. 16% in 2024) and fewer say it is getting stronger (26% vs. 39% in 2024).

These are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey conducted March 24-30, 2025, among 3,605 U.S. adults. The survey followed the Trump administration's [ending of most USAID](#)

Roughly half of Americans say U.S. influence in the world is getting weaker

% of U.S. adults who say the influence of each of the following in the world has been ___ in recent years



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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[programs](#), and while it was in the field, the administration announced plans to [cut nearly all of the agency's staff](#). It took place before Trump announced [sweeping tariffs on many countries](#) in April.

In addition to the topics above, the survey explores U.S. public opinion on a variety of other foreign policy issues.

How important is it that the U.S. is respected around the world?

- 91% of Americans believe it is important that the U.S. is respected around the world, including 57% who say this is *very* important.
- Fewer, however, think the U.S. actually *is* respected (56%). Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to express this view (72% vs. 39%).

Military and economic power

- Though many believe the U.S. is losing global influence, 76% still say the U.S. is the world's leading military power and 48% say it is the top economic power.
- 14% say China is the top military power, while 8% say Russia. And 38% say China is the world's leading economy, while 7% say Japan and 6% say the countries of the EU.
- Republicans are more likely than Democrats both to see the U.S. as the leading military power (80% vs. 73%) and as the leading economic power (58% vs. 40%).

Top U.S. allies

- When asked which country is the United States' most important ally in an open-ended question, respondents name the UK (18%) more often than any other nation, followed by Canada (12%) and Israel (9%).
- Nearly four-in-ten U.S. adults (37%) say they are not sure.

Guide to this report

- [Chapter 1](#): International engagement and support for foreign aid
- [Chapter 2](#): The United States' standing in the world
- [Chapter 3](#): Americans' views of allies and threats

Pew Research Center has released several publications based on the March 2025 survey that explore U.S. attitudes on a variety of foreign policy issues:

- [Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews](#)
- [How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump's second term](#)
- [How Americans view trade between the U.S. and China, Canada and Mexico](#)
- [Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans](#)
- [Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War](#)

1. International engagement and support for foreign aid

As the U.S. pursues new directions in foreign policy under Trump in his second term, Americans have mixed opinions about how the U.S. should engage with other countries.

- 47% of U.S. adults say it is best for the future of the country to be active in world affairs.
- 64% think the U.S. should be willing to compromise with other countries on major international issues.
- Most Americans say the U.S. should give foreign aid, but support varies widely based on its purpose.

Related: [Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews](#)


Should the U.S. be active in world affairs?

Just under half of Americans (47%) believe it is best for the future of the country to be active in world affairs. A slightly larger share (52%) say the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on domestic issues.

There has been an increase in the share saying it's best for the country to be active in world affairs since 2024, when 42% of Americans held this view.

Democrats and older Americans more likely to say the U.S. should be active in world affairs

% who say ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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Views by age, education and party

Older Americans are more likely to prefer the U.S. play an active role in world affairs. A majority of those ages 65 and older (57%) take this stance, as do roughly half of those ages 50 to 64.

Younger adults are more likely to say the U.S. should concentrate on problems at home, rather than problems overseas. A 58% majority of adults under 50 say this, while 41% prefer the U.S. be active in world affairs.

Support for international engagement is higher among Americans with more education: 65% of those with a postgraduate degree say it's best for the U.S. to be active in world affairs, while 53% of those with a four-year college degree and 41% with some college or less education agree.

Roughly six-in-ten Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say the U.S. should be active in world affairs, compared with about one-third of Republicans and Republican leaners (32%). This share rises to 72% among Democrats who identify as liberal.

For their part, Republicans consistently favor a domestic focus. About two-thirds of Republicans say the U.S. should focus on problems at home, regardless of ideology.

Should the U.S. take other countries' interests into account?

Most Americans (64%) say that when dealing with major international issues, the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries, even if it means making compromises. About a third (34%) say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when other countries strongly disagree.

The share favoring international compromise has increased significantly since 2023, when 59% of Americans held this opinion.


Views by party

A large majority of Democrats (83%) say the U.S. should take other countries' interests into account when handling major international issues. This includes 76% of moderate or conservative Democrats and 91% of liberal Democrats.

Republicans are more split. Roughly half (52%) say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when other countries strongly disagree. This share rises to 58% among conservative Republicans.

More Democrats than Republicans support international compromise

% who say that when dealing with major international issues, the U.S. should **take into account the interests of other countries**, even if it means making compromises with them



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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For what reasons should the U.S. give foreign aid?


Americans' support for foreign aid varies depending on its intended purpose. More than three-quarters say that aid should be given to developing countries for medicine and medical supplies (83%) or food and clothing (78%).

Smaller majorities support aid for economic development (63%) or for strengthening democracy (61%) in other countries.

Fewer Americans approve of aid supporting other countries' militaries (39%) or art and cultural activities (34%).

Americans largely supportive of foreign aid for the purpose of medicine and basic needs

% of U.S. adults who say the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of ...



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Related: [What the data says about U.S. foreign aid](#)

Opinions on foreign aid relate to views of general international engagement: Americans who think the U.S. should be active in world affairs are more likely than those who say the country should focus on domestic issues to support foreign aid for each purpose.

Views by party

Opinions about foreign aid vary widely by party. Democrats are more supportive than Republicans of every type of foreign aid we asked about.

The partisan gap is largest on aid for art and cultural activities in other countries. A 54% majority of Democrats say the U.S. should give this kind of assistance, compared with 15% of Republicans.

Democrats are also at least 30 percentage points more likely than Republicans to approve of aid that supports economic development and strengthens democracy.

And though partisan gaps still appear, majorities of both

Democrats and Republicans say the U.S. should give medicine and medical supplies as well as food and clothing to developing countries.


Views by age

Older Americans are generally more supportive of giving foreign aid for various reasons. Those ages 50 and older are about 8 points more likely than adults under 50 to say the U.S. should provide aid for medicine and medical supplies, food and clothing, strengthening democracy, and military support.

Notably, this pattern flips when it comes to aid for art and cultural activities. Adults under 50 are 10 points more likely than their older counterparts to say the U.S. should give this type of assistance (39% vs. 29%).

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support the U.S. giving foreign aid

% who say the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of ___, by party



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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On foreign aid that supports economic development, adults ages 50 and older and those under 50 express similar support (64% vs. 62%).

Views by education

Americans with more education, when compared with those who have less, are more supportive of providing most types of foreign aid we asked about. For example, 73% of Americans with a postgraduate degree say the U.S. should give aid to strengthen democracy in other countries, compared with 65% of people whose highest attainment is a four-year college degree. A smaller majority of those with some college or less education (56%) support giving foreign aid to strengthen democracy.

There is a very similar pattern on aid for economic development. Almost three-quarters of adults with a postgraduate degree say this is something the U.S. should give, compared with 66% of people with a four-year degree and 60% of people with some college education or less.

For most other types of foreign aid asked about, people with at least a four-year degree are more supportive than those without one.

2. The United States’ standing in the world

Americans generally see their country as respected and powerful on the world stage, but they think the United States’ global influence is waning.

- While 91% say it is important for the U.S. to be respected around the world, a much smaller share (56%) say it is respected.
- 52% of Americans say their country’s influence in the world is getting weaker, roughly the same share as in 2024. But compared with last year, Democrats are much more likely – and Republicans less likely – to say U.S. influence is declining.

How important is it that the U.S. is respected globally? Is it respected?

About nine-in-ten Americans say it is important that the U.S. is respected around the world. In fact, a 57% majority say this is *very* important.


Fewer, though still a majority of 56%, think the U.S. actually is respected around the world. A relatively small share say the U.S. is very respected (10%), while the same share say it is not respected at all.

The share of Americans who believe it’s important that the U.S. is respected has not changed since last year. Nevertheless, opinions vary somewhat by party and age.


- **Party:** Republicans (92%) and Democrats (91%) agree that global respect of the U.S. is important. However, roughly seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (72%) say the U.S. is respected, compared with about four-in-ten Democrats and Democratic leaners (39%).

Roughly 9 in 10 say it is important that the U.S. is respected, but fewer say it is

% who say it is __ important that the U.S. is respected around the world



% who say the U.S. is __ respected around the world



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025. “Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid”

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- **Age:** Regardless of age, Americans say it is important that the U.S. is respected globally, but older Americans are more likely to hold this view. Older adults are also more likely than their younger counterparts to say that the U.S. is respected.

Views of the United States’ influence in the world

While a majority of Americans feel their country is respected around the world, 52% say its global influence has been getting weaker in recent years.

Around a quarter of Americans say U.S. influence has stayed about the same (24%) or that it has been getting stronger (22%) in recent years.

By comparison, almost three-quarters think China’s influence is on the rise (73%), while almost half say the same about Russia (47%).

And more people say that the international influence of Israel, India and Iran are growing than that U.S. influence is getting stronger.


The belief that U.S. influence in the world is getting weaker was also [the most common view in April 2024](#). But

Americans are somewhat more likely now to say their country’s influence is growing (22% vs. 14% last year).

This increase is at least partly driven by Republicans, who have become much more positive in their views of U.S. global influence: 34% say the country’s influence is getting stronger, compared

Roughly half of Americans say U.S. influence in the world is getting weaker

% of U.S. adults who say the influence of each of the following in the world has been ___ in recent years



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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with 10% in 2024. They've also become much less likely to say U.S. influence is getting weaker this (37% vs. 67% last year).

Democrats' views have moved in the opposite direction. Compared with 2024, there's been a slight decrease in the share of Democrats who say U.S. influence is getting stronger (11% vs. 19% last year), and a large increase in the share who say it's getting weaker (67% vs. 44%).

Adults ages 65 and older (32%) are more likely than those ages 50 to 64 (20%) or under 50 (19%) to say U.S. influence in the world is getting stronger.

When rating other countries, one of the biggest shifts since 2024 is in how Americans see the influence of Iran on the world stage. Compared with last year, more Americans now say Iran's influence is waning (28% vs. 16% then) and fewer Americans say it's getting stronger (26% vs. 39%).

The U.S. as the world's leading economic and military power


Despite the belief of many Americans that the U.S. is losing global influence, most still say the U.S. is the world's leading military power (76%), and roughly half say it is the leading economic power (48%). The next highest shares say China is the world's leading economic (38%) and military (14%) power.

As with other ratings of the U.S., Republicans generally have more positive views of their country's standing: 58% say it is the top economic power (compared with 40% of Democrats) while 80% say it is the top military power (73% of Democrats).

For more U.S. assessments of the world's top powers, read "[Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans.](#)"

The belief that the U.S. is losing global influence has gone up among Democrats, down among Republicans

% who say the influence of the U.S. in the world has been getting weaker in recent years



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025. "Majorities of Americans Support Several - But Not All - Types of Foreign Aid"

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3. Americans' views of allies and threats

- When asked which country poses the greatest threat to the U.S., China remains at the top of Americans' list. Since we last asked this question in 2023, however, the share who name China as the biggest threat has declined, while the share who name Russia has grown.
- Roughly four-in-ten Americans (37%) say they are unsure which country is the United States' greatest ally. As in the past, the United Kingdom is mentioned more than any other nation. But the shares who call Canada or Israel the top ally have increased since 2023.

Which country poses the greatest threat to the U.S.?

Roughly four-in-ten Americans (42%) say China poses the greatest threat to the U.S. when asked in an open-ended question. Russia is named by the next-largest share (25%).

Smaller shares say no country (4%), the U.S. itself (3%) or Iran (2%) is the greatest threat. One-in-five say they are not sure.

The share who name China as the greatest threat has declined from 50% in 2023. Conversely, the share who see Russia as the United States' greatest threat has grown from 17%.

Views by party


Whether China or Russia is viewed as the top threat to the U.S. varies by party affiliation.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are most likely to say that China is the United States' greatest threat (58% vs. 12% who name Russia). Conversely, Democrats and Democratic leaners are most likely to call Russia the top threat (39% vs. 28% who name China).

In 2023, China was the top choice among both Republicans and Democrats.

China and Russia named as greatest threats to the U.S.

% of U.S. adults who say ___ is the country that poses the greatest threat to the U.S.



Note: Open-ended question. Countries named by fewer than 2% of respondents are not shown. Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Conservative Republicans are especially likely to see China as a threat (68%) compared with their moderate or liberal peers (45%). Among Democrats, liberals are more likely to name Russia (46%) than those who are moderate or conservative (34%).

Do China and Russia present economic or security threats?


After respondents named the country they see as the greatest threat to the U.S., we asked them to rate how much of a threat that country poses to the U.S. economy and to U.S. national security.

Among those who name China as the country’s greatest threat, overwhelming majorities say it threatens the U.S. economy (97%) and U.S. security (94%) at least a fair amount. Indeed, most think China poses *a great deal* of threat to each.

Among those who name Russia, more see it as a security threat (98%) than an economic threat (71%).

China seen as an economic and security threat to the U.S., while Russia is viewed more as a security threat

Among those who name each as the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S., % who say it poses ___ of threat to ...



Note: Respondents were asked to consider the country they had just named as the top threat to the U.S. in an open-ended question. Those who named other countries are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

“Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid”

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Who is the United States' most important ally?

We also asked Americans which country they think is the United States' most important ally. Roughly four-in-ten (37%) say they are unsure. Among those who do give an answer, the United Kingdom is mentioned most often (by 18% of adults), followed by Canada (12%) and Israel (9%).

The share naming Canada as the top U.S. ally has doubled from 6% [since we last asked this question in 2023](#). In that time, the share naming Israel has also roughly doubled – from 4% in 2023.

These shifts over time in large part reflect changes in partisan attitudes. Republicans have become more likely to say Israel is the United States' top ally (17% vs. 8% in 2023), while views among Democrats have not changed.


At the same time, Democrats have become more likely to say that Canada is the most important ally (19% vs. 9% in 2023), while Republicans' views have not shifted.

Today, opinions also vary somewhat by age and religion:

- **Age:** Americans ages 50 and older most frequently point to the UK as the top U.S. ally (24%). In contrast, the UK is named by half as many adults under 50 (12%), and a similar share also name Canada (11%). Younger adults are much more likely than older adults to say they are not sure who the country's most important ally is (44% vs. 29%).
- **Religion:** Around a quarter each among White evangelical Protestants (25%) and Jews (26%) say Israel is the country's most important ally.

UK, Canada and Israel top Americans' list of U.S. allies

% of U.S. adults who say ___ is the United States' most important ally



Note: Open-ended question. Countries named by fewer than 2% of respondents are not shown. Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

"Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid"

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Americans' ratings of other countries

Majorities of Americans give positive ratings to fellow G7 member countries Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see these allies in a favorable light, though. Between 75% and 87% of Democrats rate these countries positively, compared with 51% to 76% of Republicans. Japan is the only country in this group that gets similar – and overwhelmingly positive – ratings from both parties.


Americans also give the EU a favorable rating (60%). Once again, Democrats rate the EU more positively than Republicans (78% vs. 44%).

Half of Americans have positive views of Mexico, up from 37% last year.

Favorable ratings of the United States' southern neighbor have increased among both Democrats and Republicans, though a large gap remains: Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans to have a positive view of Mexico (67% vs. 32%). Adults under 50 also tend to have more positive views of Mexico when compared with those ages 50 and older (55% vs. 44%).

Americans have positive views of G7 allies

% who have a *favorable* opinion of each, by party



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
 "Majorities of Americans Support Several – But Not All – Types of Foreign Aid"

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Roughly half of Americans have a positive opinion of India (49%), a slight increase from 43% in 2024.

Israel stands out among the countries included in our survey: Though 9% of Americans say it is the United States' most important ally – making it the third-most commonly named – fewer than half have a favorable view of the country (45%). This is down from 55% since we last asked in 2022.

Israel is also one of the only countries asked about that Republicans are more likely to rate positively than Democrats. In fact, Republicans are about twice as likely as Democrats to say they have a positive opinion of Israel (62% vs. 29%). And adults ages 50 and older are more likely to say this than younger adults (54% vs. 37%).

Related: [*How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump's second term*](#)

Few Americans hold positive views of China, Russia and Iran. Around one-in-five rate China positively, and roughly one-in-ten have a favorable opinion of Russia or Iran.

Along with Israel, Russia is the only other country that Republicans rate more favorably than Democrats (16% vs. 9%).

Younger adults tend to have more positive views of all three of these countries. Roughly a quarter of adults under 50 (27%), have a favorable opinion of China, compared with 15% of adults ages 50 and older; 16% of younger adults rate Russia positively, compared with 9% of older adults; and 14% of younger adults have a positive view of Iran, as do 6% of older adults.

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 24 to March 30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes [oversample](#) of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

² Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24 to March 30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,
ATP Wave 166**

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 24, 2025	March 25, 2025
First reminder	March 27, 2025	March 27, 2025
Final reminder	March 29, 2025	March 29, 2025

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

³ The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

⁴ Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2023 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	
Voter registration	2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Party affiliation among registered voters	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 166

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,605	1.9 percentage points
Form 1	1,804	2.7 percentage points
Form 2	1,801	2.6 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,586	2.7 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,909	2.7 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim, and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 166

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,605
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	65
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	25
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	346
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
Total panelists sampled for the survey		4,045
Completed interviews	I	3,605
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	90
Non-contact	NC	346
Other	O	4
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,045
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		89%

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Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 166

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 166	35%
Response rate to Wave 166 survey	89%
Cumulative response rate	3%

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey
May 1, 2025 release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the [Methodology section](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Combined totals are based on unrounded topline figures. Prior to 2024, combined totals were based on rounded topline figures, so these figures might be different than in previous years.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

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		FAV_CHINA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? China							Total
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	21	77	2	19	44	33	2	100
	Spring, 2024	16	81	1	14	38	43	3	100
	Spring, 2023	14	83	1	13	39	44	2	100
	Spring, 2022	16	82	2	14	42	40	2	100
	Spring, 2021	21	77	1	19	37	39	3	100
	March, 2020	19	79	2	17	44	35	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		FAV_CHINA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? China							Total
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Summer, 2020	22	73	3	19	31	42	6	100
	Spring, 2020	27	66	3	23	33	33	7	100
	Spring, 2019	26	60	4	22	37	23	13	100
	Spring, 2018	38	48	5	33	32	15	14	100
	Spring, 2017	43	47	5	39	33	14	10	100
	Spring, 2016	37	55	6	31	36	19	9	100
	Spring, 2015	38	54	4	34	33	21	8	100
	Spring, 2014	35	55	7	28	34	21	10	100
	Spring, 2013	36	51	7	30	32	20	12	100
	Spring, 2012	41	40	6	34	25	15	19	100
	Spring, 2011	52	36	12	39	22	14	12	100
	Spring, 2010	49	37	10	39	24	12	14	100
	Spring, 2009	49	38	9	41	25	13	13	100
	Spring, 2008	40	42	9	30	26	16	19	100
	Spring, 2007	42	40	8	34	25	14	18	100
	Spring, 2006	52	29	12	40	19	10	19	100
Spring, 2005	43	35	9	34	22	13	22	100	

		FAV_EU. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? The European Union							Total
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	60	37	13	47	27	10	3	100
	Spring, 2024	61	35	9	52	23	11	5	100
	Spring, 2023	61	35	8	53	26	10	4	100
	Spring, 2022	64	33	9	55	25	8	3	100
	Spring, 2021	62	34	8	54	26	9	4	100
	March, 2020	59	38	9	51	28	10	3	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		FAV_EU. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? The European Union							Total
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Summer, 2020	59	28	14	45	18	10	14	100
	Spring, 2020	56	27	13	44	17	10	17	100
	Spring, 2019	51	27	11	40	16	11	21	100
	Spring, 2016	53	27	11	42	18	9	20	100
	Spring, 2014	58	26	11	47	17	9	16	100
	Spring, 2013	50	27	10	40	19	7	24	100
	Spring, 2012	50	21	9	41	16	5	29	100
	Spring, 2011	55	22	15	40	16	6	23	100
	Spring, 2010	57	21	13	44	14	6	23	100
	Spring, 2009	56	22	14	42	15	8	22	100
	Spring, 2007	48	22	9	38	15	7	30	100
	Spring, 2004	39	27	7	32	17	9	35	100
	Summer, 2002	53	14	13	40	10	4	33	100

		FAV_RUSSIA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Russia							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	13	85	1	11	34	51	2	100
	Spring, 2024	11	86	1	10	29	57	3	100
	Spring, 2023	7	91	1	6	29	62	2	100
	Spring, 2022	7	92	1	6	23	69	1	100
	March, 2020	15	83	1	14	42	41	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		FAV_RUSSIA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Russia							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	18	71	2	17	34	37	11	100
	Spring, 2020	22	68	3	19	34	34	10	100
	Spring, 2019	18	67	2	16	31	36	14	100
	Spring, 2018	21	64	3	18	33	31	15	100
	Spring, 2017	29	63	3	26	35	28	9	100
	Spring, 2015	22	67	3	19	40	27	12	100
	Spring, 2014	19	72	3	16	34	38	9	100
	Spring, 2013	37	43	4	33	29	14	20	100
	Spring, 2012	37	39	5	32	27	13	24	100
	Spring, 2011	49	32	8	41	22	10	19	100
	Spring, 2010	49	33	7	42	24	8	19	100
	Spring, 2009	43	39	7	36	27	12	18	100
	Spring, 2007	44	34	4	40	24	11	21	100

		FAV_ISRAEL. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Israel							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	45	53	13	31	34	19	3	100
	Spring, 2022	55	42	14	41	31	10	4	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		FAV_ISRAEL. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Israel							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2013	57	27	21	36	18	9	17	100

		FAV_INDIA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? India							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	49	48	4	45	38	9	4	100
	Spring, 2024	43	52	3	39	40	12	5	100
	Spring, 2023	51	44	3	48	35	9	4	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		FAV_INDIA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? India							
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2018	51	23	7	43	17	6	26	100
	Spring, 2015	63	25	9	54	17	8	11	100
	Spring, 2014	55	30	9	46	20	10	14	100
	Fall, 2009	56	25	10	46	16	8	19	100
	Spring, 2008	64	14	18	45	11	3	22	100

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_CANADA. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Canada								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	74	25	27	46	19	6	2	100	1804

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_MEXICO. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Mexico								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	50	49	8	42	35	13	1	100	1804
	Spring, 2024	37	60	5	32	38	21	3	100	3600

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_MEXICO. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Mexico								
		TOTAL favorable	TOTAL unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	
U.S.	Spring, 2017	65	29	19	47	19	11	5	100	
	Spring, 2010	53	33	13	41	20	13	14	100	
	Fall, 2009	44	45	9	35	28	17	11	100	
	Spring, 2007	47	37	9	38	23	14	16	100	

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_IRAN. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Iran								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	10	87	1	10	39	47	3	100	1804
	March, 2020	9	89	1	8	40	48	2	100	8914

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_IRAN. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Iran								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	
U.S.	Summer, 2020	16	73	2	14	32	42	11	100	
	Spring, 2020	17	72	2	15	30	43	10	100	
	Spring, 2015	14	76	1	13	28	48	9	100	
	Spring, 2014	13	76	2	12	30	46	11	100	
	Spring, 2013	16	69	2	14	27	42	15	100	
	Spring, 2012	13	68	1	12	26	42	19	100	
	Spring, 2011	19	67	3	16	28	39	14	100	
	Spring, 2010	19	66	3	15	29	38	15	100	
	Fall, 2009	11	77	1	10	25	52	12	100	
	Spring, 2009	21	64	4	17	28	35	15	100	
	Spring, 2008	20	64	5	15	27	37	16	100	
	Spring, 2007	15	72	2	12	26	45	14	100	
	Spring, 2006	25	57	8	17	26	31	18	100	

		ASK IF FORM 2: FAV_FRANCE. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? France								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	64	32	12	52	25	7	3	100	1801
	Spring, 2024	64	32	9	55	23	8	5	100	3600

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		ASK IF FORM 2: FAV_FRANCE. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? France								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	
U.S.	Fall, 2009	61	25	16	46	17	8	14	100	
	Spring, 2007	48	30	11	37	18	12	21	100	
	Spring, 2006	51	30	15	37	18	12	19	100	
	Spring, 2005	46	33	11	35	19	14	21	100	
	Spring, 2004	32	49	8	25	25	24	19	100	
May, 2003	29	60	8	21	24	36	10	100		

		ASK IF FORM 2: FAV_GERMANY. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Germany								
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	65	32	11	54	26	6	3	100	1801
	Spring, 2024	64	31	11	53	24	7	5	100	3600
	Spring, 2021	68	28	12	56	22	6	4	100	1287

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U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		ASK IF FORM 2: FAV_GERMANY. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Germany							Total
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Fall, 2009	66	19	21	45	14	5	16	100
	Spring, 2007	61	16	15	46	11	5	23	100
	Spring, 2006	66	13	20	46	9	4	21	100
	Spring, 2005	60	17	15	45	13	4	23	100
	Spring, 2004	50	27	8	42	19	9	23	100
	May, 2003	44	42	8	36	27	15	14	100

		ASK IF FORM 2: FAV_UK. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? The United Kingdom							Total	N=
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused		
U.S.	Spring, 2025	70	27	16	54	20	7	3	100	1801
	Spring, 2024	70	27	14	56	19	7	4	100	3600

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_JAPAN. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Japan							Total	N=
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused		
U.S.	Spring, 2025	77	21	22	55	16	5	2	100	1804

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		ASK IF FORM 1: FAV_JAPAN. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Japan							Total
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Spring, 2018	69	15	23	45	11	5	16	100
	Spring, 2015	75	18	22	52	12	6	7	100
	Spring, 2014	70	20	21	49	13	7	10	100
	Fall, 2009	67	20	21	46	13	7	13	100
	Spring, 2008	70	12	25	45	8	3	18	100
	Spring, 2006	66	13	22	44	9	4	21	100
	Spring, 2005	63	16	17	46	12	5	21	100

		ASK IF FORM 2: FAV_ITALY. Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of...? Italy							Total	N=
		TOTAL Favorable	TOTAL Unfavorable	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused		
U.S.	Spring, 2025	74	22	12	63	18	4	4	100	1801

		ECON_POWER. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power?					Total
		The U.S.	China	Japan	The countries of the European Union	DK/Refused	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	48	38	7	6	2	100
	Spring, 2023	48	38	5	6	3	100
	Spring, 2022	43	43	3	7	3	100
	March, 2020	54	33	5	6	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		ECON_POWER. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power?							
		The U.S.	China	Japan	The countries of the European Union	Other (DO NOT READ)	None/There is no leading economic power (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	52	32	5	6	0	0	4	100
	Spring, 2020	59	30	3	4	0	1	3	100
	Spring, 2019	50	32	7	6	1	1	4	100
	Spring, 2018	49	33	6	7	1	1	4	100
	Spring, 2017	51	35	5	5	0	0	2	100
	Spring, 2016	54	34	6	2	0	1	3	100
	Spring, 2015	46	36	7	7	0	1	3	100
	Spring, 2014	40	41	8	7	0	0	4	100
	Spring, 2013	39	44	7	4	0	1	6	100
	Spring, 2012	40	41	6	5	0	1	7	100
	Spring, 2011	38	43	6	6	0	0	6	100
	Spring, 2010	38	41	8	6	0	0	7	100
	Spring, 2009	48	33	7	5	0	1	6	100
Spring, 2008	46	26	10	10	0	1	7	100	

		MIL_POWER. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading military power?				
		The U.S.	China	Russia	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	76	14	8	2	100
	Spring, 2022	70	19	9	3	100
	March, 2020	83	7	8	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		MIL_POWER. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading military power?						
		The U.S.	China	Russia	Other (DO NOT READ)	None/There is no leading military power (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2020	83	6	8	1	0	3	100
	Spring, 2016	72	12	10	3	0	3	100

		ALLIES_OPEN. What country do you think is the U.S.'s most important ally? [OPEN-END]														
		Canada	China	EU	France	Germany	Israel	Japan	Mexico	Russia	UK	Other	No country	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	12	2	4	1	1	9	2	1	2	18	2	7	37	2	100

		THREATS_OPEN. What country do you think poses the greatest threat to the U.S.? [OPEN-END]										
		China	Iran	Israel	North Korea	Russia	United States	Other	No country	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	42	2	1	1	25	3	2	4	20	1	100

		ASK IF ANY COUNTRY WAS LISTED IN THREATS_OPEN: THREAT_TYPE_ECON. To what extent does the country you listed in the previous question pose a threat to...? The U.S. economy									
		TOTAL A great deal/A fair amount	TOTAL Not too much/Not at all	A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total	N=	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	86	14	52	34	13	1	0	100	2761	
	May, 2023	91	9	66	25	8	1	0	100	8170	

		ASK IF ANY COUNTRY WAS LISTED IN THREATS_OPEN: THREAT_TYPE_SEC. To what extent does the country you listed in the previous question pose a threat to...? U.S. national security									
		TOTAL A great deal/A fair amount	TOTAL Not too much/Not at all	A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total	N=	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	95	5	66	29	4	1	0	100	2761	
	May, 2023	96	4	71	25	3	1	0	100	8170	

		RESPECT_IMPORT. How important, if at all, is it that the U.S. is generally respected by other countries around the world?							
		TOTAL Important	TOTAL Not important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	91	8	57	34	7	2	0	100
	Spring, 2024	90	9	55	35	8	2	1	100
	Spring, 2021	87	13	50	37	9	4	0	100

		RESPECT_CURRENT. How respected is the U.S. around the world?							
		TOTAL Respected	TOTAL Not respected	Very respected	Somewhat respected	Not too respected	Not at all respected	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	56	44	10	45	34	10	1	100

		ACTIVE. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right?			
		It's best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs	We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	47	52	1	100
	April, 2024	42	57	2	100
	Spring, 2023	43	55	1	100
	May, 2022	48	51	1	100
	Spring, 2021	49	50	1	100
	September, 2019	53	46	1	100
	March, 2019	51	48	1	100

		COMPROMISE. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right? When dealing with major international issues, our country should...?			
		Take into account the interests of other countries even if it means making compromises with them	Follow its own interests even when other countries strongly disagree	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	64	34	2	100
	Spring, 2023	59	39	2	100
	March, 2020	66	32	1	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		COMPROMISE. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right? When dealing with major international issues, our country should...?			
		Take into account the interests of other countries even if it means making compromises with them	Follow its own interests even when other countries strongly disagree	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Summer, 2020	58	39	3	100
	Spring, 2020	61	36	3	100

		ASK IF FORM 1: GROWINFLU1_CHINA. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? China					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	73	6	19	2	100	1804
	Spring, 2024	71	9	17	3	100	3600
	Spring, 2022	66	10	22	2	100	3581

		ASK IF FORM 1: GROWINFLU1_RUSSIA. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? Russia					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	47	21	30	2	100	1804
	Spring, 2024	48	24	25	3	100	3600
	Spring, 2022	38	37	22	2	100	3581

		ASK IF FORM 1: GROWINFLU1_INDIA. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? India					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	32	9	56	3	100	1804
	Spring, 2024	35	10	50	5	100	3600
	Spring, 2022	23	11	64	3	100	3581

		ASK IF FORM 2: GROWINFLU1_GERMANY. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? Germany					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	21	23	53	3	100	1801
	Spring, 2024	18	19	58	4	100	3600
	Spring, 2022	21	15	61	3	100	3581

		ASK IF FORM 2: GROWINFLU1_ISRAEL. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? Israel					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	38	23	37	3	100	1801

		ASK IF FORM 2: GROWINFLU1_UK. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? The United Kingdom					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	16	28	54	3	100	1801
	Spring, 2024	12	31	53	3	100	3600
	Spring, 2022	13	23	61	2	100	3581

		ASK IF FORM 2: GROWINFLU1_IRAN. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? Iran					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	26	28	43	3	100	1801
	Spring, 2024	39	16	41	4	100	3600

		ASK IF FORM 1: GROWINFLU1_COUNTRY. For each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been...? The U.S.					
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	22	52	24	1	100	1804
	Spring, 2024	14	54	29	2	100	3600
	Spring, 2022	19	47	32	2	100	3581

		AID_REASON_DEM. Thinking about foreign aid the U.S. may give, either directly or through international organizations, do you think the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of...? Strengthening democracy in other countries			
		Yes, should give foreign aid for this reason	No, should not give foreign aid for this reason	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	61	37	2	100

		AID_REASON_MED. Thinking about foreign aid the U.S. may give, either directly or through international organizations, do you think the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of...? Providing medicine and medical supplies to developing countries			
		Yes, should give foreign aid for this reason	No, should not give foreign aid for this reason	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	83	16	1	100

		AID_REASON_MIL. Thinking about foreign aid the U.S. may give, either directly or through international organizations, do you think the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of...? Providing support and weapons to militaries in other countries			
		Yes, should give foreign aid for this reason	No, should not give foreign aid for this reason	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	39	58	3	100

		AID_REASON_BASIC. Thinking about foreign aid the U.S. may give, either directly or through international organizations, do you think the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of...? Providing food and clothing to people in developing countries			
		Yes, should give foreign aid for this reason	No, should not give foreign aid for this reason	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	78	21	2	100

		AID_REASON_ECON. Thinking about foreign aid the U.S. may give, either directly or through international organizations, do you think the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of...? Supporting economic development in developing countries			
		Yes, should give foreign aid for this reason	No, should not give foreign aid for this reason	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	63	35	2	100

		AID_REASON_CULTURE. Thinking about foreign aid the U.S. may give, either directly or through international organizations, do you think the U.S. should give foreign aid for the purpose of...? Supporting art and cultural activities in other countries			
		Yes, should give foreign aid for this reason	No, should not give foreign aid for this reason	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	34	64	2	100

		U.S. Party ID with Leaners			
		Reps and Rep Leaners	Dems and Dem Leaners	DK/Refused/No lean	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	48	48	5	100