{"id":73934,"date":"2010-09-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-09-15T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/beta.pewresearch.org\/pewresearch-org\/2010\/09\/15\/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-radical-islamist-movements-jihadi-networks-and-hizb-ut-tahrir\/"},"modified":"2024-04-14T04:13:43","modified_gmt":"2024-04-14T09:13:43","slug":"muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-radical-islamist-movements-jihadi-networks-and-hizb-ut-tahrir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/beta.pewresearch.org\/pewresearch-org\/religion\/2010\/09\/15\/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-radical-islamist-movements-jihadi-networks-and-hizb-ut-tahrir\/","title":{"rendered":"Radical Islamist Movements: Jihadi Networks and Hizb ut-Tahrir"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a>Islamic radicalism in Western Europe is generally associated with networks and cells affiliated with global jihadi organizations, such as al-Qaeda, whose ideology calls for the violent pursuit of a global Islamic political order. By most accounts, support for radical extremist groups is relatively low among Muslims in Europe.[1. numoffset=”27″ See, for example, \u201cThe Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other<\/a>,\u201d Pew Research Center\u2019s Global Attitudes Project, June 22, 2006.] Nevertheless, such groups have been central to the public discussion of Islam in Europe, especially in recent years. Dramatic and violent events perpetrated by jihadi cells, such as the Madrid bombings of 2004 and the attacks on the London transport system the following year, have fostered a growing fear of Islamic extremism among many Europeans and others in the West.<\/p>\n\n

\"Muslim
Office workers at London\u2019s Canary Wharf observe a two-minute silence in memory of the victims of the July 7, 2005, bombings one week after the attacks. Credit: Rolf Soderlind\/Reuters\/Corbis<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/figure>\n\n

But violent jihadi organizations represent only one segment of a broader ecology of Islamic radicalism that includes militants without direct operational ties to any group, as well as nonviolent radicals who disavow the use of force to affect political change, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. While media and policy elites often lump these various strains of radicalism together, the political logic that drives the groups often varies significantly.<\/p>\n\n

<\/a><\/p>\n\n

[2.\u00a0See, for example, Robert Lambert, \u201cEmpowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study,\u201d PS: Political Science & Politics<\/em>, Volume 41, Number 1, pages 31-35, 2008.]<\/p>\n\n\n

Arrival and Growth of Violent Radicalism in Europe<\/h2>\n\n

The origins of Islamic radicalism in Western Europe can be traced to the 1970s and \u201980s, when a number of Muslim dissidents, including some jihadi ideologues affiliated with violent offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, were forced to flee their home countries, such as Egypt and Syria, and arrived in Europe. Europe itself was not initially viewed as a battleground for these early jihadis, who tended to focus on struggles back home. During the 1990s, for example, militants from the Groupe Islamique Arm\u00e9 (Armed Islamic Group) in Algeria used France and Britain as staging grounds to organize and raise funds to continue their struggle against Algeria\u2019s secular government.<\/p>\n\n

\"Muslim
Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri speaks at a rally organized by the radical Islamic group Al-Muhajiroun in London\u2019s Trafalgar Square on Aug. 25, 2002. Credit: Reuters\/CORBIS<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/figure>\n\n

But the 1990s also witnessed the arrival in Europe of a number of radicals with a broader, more global agenda. Some of these ideologues \u2014 such as Syria\u2019s Abu Mus\u2019ab al-Suri and Jordan\u2019s Abu Qatada \u2014 had close ties to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Both figures are considered major voices within global jihadi circles, having written some of the most influential theoretical treatises on global jihad and having worked directly with armed Islamist groups in North Africa and Afghanistan.<\/p>\n\n

Another key figure is Abu Hamza al-Masri, a veteran of jihadi efforts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, who has lived in the United Kingdom since the late 1970s. Abu Hamza was the imam of the North London Central (\u201cFinsbury Park\u201d) Mosque during the period in the late 1990s and early 2000s when it became widely regarded as a bastion of radical preaching. Since 2006, Abu Hamza has been in a British prison, convicted of multiple terrorism-related offenses.<\/p>\n\n

While Europe had seen sparks of exported foreign conflicts during the 1990s \u2013 such as the 1995 Paris bombing linked to the Algerian Groupe Islamique Arm\u00e9 \u2013 it was the aftermath of the 9\/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, and their connection to an al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany, that brought wider attention to the question of whether Europe might be serving as a staging ground for global jihadi activities.<\/p>\n\n

The Madrid train bombings of 2004 \u2014 perpetrated by a group of North Africans ideologically inspired by, although seemingly not operationally linked to, al-Qaeda \u2014 raised fears that Europe had become more than a haven for jihadist groups and was now one of their targets. These fears were significantly compounded the following year by the suicide bomb attacks on London\u2019s transportation system planned and carried out by four second-generation British citizens, all but one of whom had been raised in the U.K.<\/p>\n\n

With concerns about the radicalization of Muslim youth on the rise, European governments, starting in the mid-2000s, embarked on a range of strategies to counter this newly perceived threat. In the U.K., for example, significant funds were poured into a wide range of counter-radicalization efforts, such as the Preventing Violent Extremism program, which provides interfaith educational programs and funding for other initiatives aimed at building up the credibility of moderate interpretations of Islam in the eyes of Muslim youth.<\/p>\n\n

Size and Makeup of Radical Groups<\/h2>\n\n

<\/a><\/p>\n\n

\"Muslim
Spanish railway workers and police examine the debris of a destroyed train at Madrid\u2019s Atocha railway station after the March 2004 train bombings. Credit: Anja Niedringhaus\/Associated Press<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/figure>\n\n

Reliable data on the size and influence of radical groups are difficult to come by. Some estimates have suggested that the number of radical Islamists active in jihadi cells or networks in Europe has never exceeded more than several hundred.[3. See Petter Nesser, \u201cJihad in Europe: A survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism in post-millennium Europe,\u201d Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2004.]\u00a0One report estimated that there were 28 active jihadi networks in Europe from 2001-2006.[4. Edwin Bakker, \u201cJihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad,\u201d Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), December 2006.]<\/p>\n\n

Limited in scale, radicalization has also proven to be an idiosyncratic phenomenon. In some cases, the individuals involved \u2013 such as \u201cshoe bomber\u201d Richard Reid, who in 2001 tried to set off a bomb on a commercial aircraft \u2013 have a history of social alienation and involvement with petty crime. In other cases, those involved in violent acts \u2013 such as London subway bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan \u2013 are highly educated and seemingly well-integrated individuals.<\/p>\n\n

<\/a><\/p>\n\n

While direct organizational ties to global jihadists such as al-Qaeda have rarely been established in the case of European jihadists, it is clear that broad ideological affinities do exist between self-starter cells in the West and the militant Islamism of bin Laden and al-Qaeda\u2019s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In some cases, European militants appear to have received organizational or material support from alleged al-Qaeda regional affiliates, such as North Africa\u2019s \u201cal-Qaeda in the Maghreb.”[5. The Maghreb (literally \u201cthe place of the sunset\u201d or \u201cwest\u201d) is a term commonly used in Arabic to refer to the northernmost region of Africa containing the predominantly Arab and Muslim nations of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, along with the disputed territory of Western Sahara.]\u00a0In other instances, however, militants appear to have found inspiration from other sources, such as jihadi websites. Recent years have also witnessed a number of European jihadis traveling from the continent to areas of conflict in the broader Muslim world, such as Iraq, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa.[6. See, for example, Craig S. Smith and Don van Natta, Jr., \u201cOfficials Fear Iraq\u2019s Lure for Muslims in Europe<\/a>,\u201d The New York Times<\/em>, Oct. 23, 2004, and Tristan McConnell, \u201cBritish and American Fighters Respond to Jihad Call in Somalia<\/a>,\u201d The Times (of London)<\/em>, May 23, 2009.]<\/p>\n\n

Snapshot: Radical Islamist Movements: Jihadi Networks and Hizb ut-Tahrir<\/h3>
\n

Origin<\/strong>\nHave used Europe for sanctuary and fundraising since the 1970s but began concerted\norganizing and recruiting efforts on the continent in the 1990s.<\/p>\n

Stated Purpose\/Goals <\/strong>\nTo replace democracy and the nation-state, whose legitimacy they reject, with legal and political systems based on Islamic teachings.<\/p>\n

Method\/Activities<\/strong>\nNetworks and cells affiliated with global jihadi groups, such as al-Qaeda, as well as individual\nmilitants without direct operational ties to any group, pursue an agenda that calls for the violent pursuit of a global Islamic political order. Nonviolent radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (\u201cParty of Liberation\u201d) seek to establish Islamic rule through political means.<\/p>\n

Representative Organizations\/Key Figures <\/strong><\/p>\n